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Abstract:	  English
One	  purpose	  of	  this 	  Master	   Thesis 	  is 	  to	  give	  us	  an	  insight	  on	  the	  reasons 	  why	  a 	  manager	  
would	   choose 	   to	   engage	   in	   a 	  merger,	   by	   analyzing	   its	   decision	   from	   a 	   ﬁnancial 	   and	   a	  
strategical 	   perspec=ve.	   The	   other	   research	   direc=on	   looks 	  at	   governments 	  decisions	   to	  
priva=ze	  state-­‐owned	  companies	  with	  the 	  purpose	  of	  oﬀering	  possible 	  explana=ons	  to	  why	  
the	   state	  would	  willingly	   transfer	   its 	  ownership	   to	   the 	  private	   sector.	   Building	  up	   on	  the	  
theore=cal 	   concepts,	   a 	  case	   study	   is 	   presented:	   the	  merger	   of	   E.ON,	   the	   acquirer,	   with	  
Electrica	  Moldova,	  the	  target	  and	  a	  formerly	  state-­‐owned	  u=lity	  from	  Romania.
The	  geographical	  area 	  of	  interest	  for	  this 	  paper	  is	  the	  South	  Central 	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  The	  
region	  per	  se	  is 	  highly	  challenging	  but	  has	  an	  increased	  business 	  poten=al 	  at	  the 	  same	  =me,	  
largely	  aKrac=ng	  foreign	  direct	   investments 	  over	  the	  last	  years.	  The 	  challenge	  comes 	  from	  
the	  environment’s 	  speciﬁcity	   and	   from	   the 	  par=culari=es 	  of	   the 	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  
possibly	   all 	  due 	  to	  a	  common	  post-­‐communist	  heritage.	  Moreover,	   the	  focus 	  casts 	  on	  the	  
energy	   sector	   ﬁrstly,	  because 	  the	  priva=za=on	  of	  state-­‐owned	  u=li=es 	  usually	   brings 	  along	  
other	  addi=onal 	  beneﬁts,	   and	  then	  because	  of	  the	  sector’s	  crucial 	  importance	  for	  the	  local	  
and	  regional	  sustainable	  development.	  
ANer	   analyzing	   the	  theore=cal 	  concepts 	  and	  applying	   them	   in	   prac=ce	  using	   the	  case	   in	  
point	  priva=za=on	  and	  merger,	  the	  paper	  ends 	  with	  drawing	  the	  relevant	  conclusions.	  Some	  
recommenda=ons	  for	  future	  research	  are	  made	  at	  the	  end.
Abstract:	  Deutsch
Diese	  Magisterarbeit	  behandelt	  zwei	  Fragestellungen:	  Zum	  einem	  sollen	  die	  ﬁnanziellen	  und	  
strategischen	   Beweggründe,	   die	   zu	   einer	   Fusion	   oder	   Übernahme	   führen,	   aus	   Sicht	   der	  
Firmenleitung	   beleuchtet	   werden.	   Ferner	   sollen	  die	  zur	   Priva=sierungsentscheidungen	  im	  
öﬀentlichen	  Sektor	  führenden	  Mo=ve	  aufgezeigt	  und	  analysiert	  werden.	  	  AuVauend	  auf	  den	  
hierbei	   erarbeiteten	   theore=schen	   Konzepten	   wird	   eine 	   Case 	   Study	   vorgestellt:	   Die	  
Übernahme	   des 	   ehemaligen	   rumänischen	   Staatsunternehmens	   Electrica 	   Moldova	  
(Zielunternehmen)	  durch	  E.ON	  (Käufer).	  
Geographisches 	  Hauptaugenmerk	  dieser	  Arbeit	  liegt	  auf	  MiKel-­‐/Osteuropa.	  	  Zwar	  handelt	  es	  
sich	   hier	   durchaus	   um	   eine	   hoch	   prekäre	   Region,	   dennoch	   führen	   zunehmende	  
GeschäNsmöglichkeiten	  zu	  einem	  großen	  Ans=eg	  der	  ausländischen	  Direk=nves==onen.	  	  Die	  
Speziﬁtät	   des 	   Umfeldes	   und	   Eigenheiten	   der	   vorherrschenden	   Entscheidungsprozesse,	  
vermutlich	  beides	  auf	  die 	  kommunis=sche 	  Vergangenheit	  der	  Region	  zurückzuführen,	  stellen	  
jedoch	  Schwierigkeiten	  dar.	   Die 	  Energiebranche 	  wurde	  gewählt,	   da 	  die	  Priva=sierung	  von	  
staatlichen	  Versorgern	  für	  gewöhnlich	  zusätzlichen	  Nutzen	  bringt	  und	  der	  Industriezweig	  von	  
grundlegender	  Bedeutung	  für	  eine 	  nachhal=ge	  Entwicklung	  auf	  lokaler	  und	  regionaler	  Ebene	  
ist.
Nach	  Analyse	  der	   theore=schen	  Konzepte	  und	  deren	  prak=schen	  Anwendung	   im	  Rahmen	  
der	   Case	   Study,	   werden	   abschließend	   die	   relevanten	   Schlussfolgerungen	   gezogen	   und	  
Empfehlungen	  für	  zukünNige	  Forschungsarbeiten	  gegeben.	  
Explaining	  my	  Interest	  in	  the	  Topic
My	  interest	  in	  the	  energy	  industry	  and	  possible	  mechanisms	  to	  improve	  the	  eﬃciency	  in	  this	  
par=cular	  strategic	  domain	  dates 	  back	  to	  last	  year	  when	  I	  accidentally	  came	  across 	  an	  ar=cle	  
in	  a 	  Romanian	   newspaper	   rela=ng	   to	   the	  energy	   crisis	   that	   began	   shortly	   aNer	   1937.	   In	  
par=cular,	   the	  ar=cle	  highlighted	   future 	  oil	   shortage,	   followed	  by	   a 	  natural 	  gas 	  shortage,	  
which	  can	  explain	  present	  and	  future	  energy	  produc=on	  and	  consump=on	  paKerns.	   In	  this	  
sense,	  high	  energy	  bills 	  (electricity	  or	  gas)	  for	  home	  hea=ng	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a 	  tool 	  of	  crea=ng	  
public	  awareness	  of	  energy	  prices.
At	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna	  I	  was	  fortunate	  to	  have	  courses 	  such	  as 	  Interna=onal 	  Strategy	  
and	  Organiza=on	  with	  topics 	  regarding	  priva=za=on	  in	  SEE	  that	  have	  further	  s=mulated	  my	  
interest	   in	  the 	  SEE	  emerging	  markets 	  as 	  an	  opportunity	   to	  do	  business.	  These	  courses 	  have	  
enabled	   me	   to	   achieve	   a 	   theore=cal 	   framework	   to	   work	   with	   in	   the	   future 	   and	   have	  
provided	  me	  a	  fundamental	  understanding	  of	  how	  analy=cal	  thinking	  works.
In	  the	  summer	   of	  2009,	   I	  was 	  lucky	   enough	   to	  get	  an	  internship	  at	  E.ON	  Romania,	   in	  the	  
Planning	   and	  Controlling	  Department	   where 	  I	  was	  responsible 	  for	   doing	  market	   research	  
about	  compe=tors 	  such	  as 	  CEZ	  SA,	   cost	  analysis	  and	  cost	  of	  capital 	  calcula=ons 	  as 	  well.	   It	  
was	  there	  that	  I	  came	  to	  learn	  more	  about	   the	  Romanian	  Energy	  Market.	  Again	  I 	  was 	  very	  
fortunate	  to	  spend	  some	  very	   fruijul 	  =me	  with	  very	  knowledgeable 	  people	  in	  the 	  industry	  
including	  execu=ves	  from	  whom	   I	  learnt	   about	   E.ONs	  acquisi=ve 	  vision,	   or	   engineers 	  that	  
ﬁlled	  me	  in	  with	  many	  of	  the	  technical	  issues.	  These	  individuals 	  made	  a	  special 	  contribu=on	  
to	  my	  understanding	  of	  both	  the	  company	  and	  the	  industry.	  
Addi=onally,	  the	  energy	   industry	  sector	  has 	  essen=al 	  importance	  on	  the 	  local,	  regional,	  and	  
global 	  level	  because	  of	  its 	  huge	  impact	  on	  sustainable	  development.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  it	  
all 	  reduces	  to	   combining	   the	  beneﬁts 	  of	   adding	  economic	   value	  by	   doing	  business 	  in	  the	  
sector	  with	  the 	  costs 	  implied.	  Consequently,	  we,	  as	  consumers,	  have	  to	  take 	  into	  account	  the	  
resource	  based	  view	  and	  the 	  environmental 	  concerns.	  Resources	  are	  scarce	  and	  have 	  to	  be	  
allocated	  op=mally	  and	  by	  reducing	  the	  damage	  on	  the	  environment	  to	  its	  minimum.
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IntroducCon
1. Focus	  of	  the	  Research
In	  the	  last	  20	  years,	  interna=onal	  corporate	  governance	  has	  known	  signiﬁcant	  development	  
due 	   to	   the	   intense	   ac=vity	   of	   priva=za=on	   of	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises.	   There	   is 	   clear	  
evidence 	   from	   all	   over	   the 	   world	   that	   priva=za=on	   has	   inﬂuenced	   posi=vely	   the 	   ﬁrm	  
performance,	  however	  it	  is 	  diﬃcult	  to	  isolate	  the	  source 	  for	  this	  improvement.	  The	  facts 	  and	  
ﬁgures	  across 	  countries 	  and	  industries 	  indicate	  that	  mergers 	  result	  in	  net	  wealth	  crea=on	  for	  
priva=zed	  enterprises	  and	   thus 	  indicate 	  that	   one	  eﬀect	   of	  priva=za=on	  is	  wealth-­‐crea=ng	  
mergers.
	  
The	  aim	  of	  this 	  paper	   is 	  to	  iden=fy	  the	  reasons	  that	  stand	  behind	  M&As	  when	  looking	  from	  
a 	  ﬁrm’s	  perspec=ve,	   on	  the	  one 	  hand,	  and	  to	  highlight	   the 	  main	  reasons	  standing	  behind	  
priva=zing	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  when	  looking	  from	  the	  government’s 	  point	  of	  view,	   on	  
the	  other.	   What	   the 	  two	  theore=cal 	  concepts 	  presented	   (M&A	   and	  Priva=za=on)	  have	   in	  
common	  is 	  the	  transfer	  of	  ownership.	  However,	  the	  crucial	  dis=nc=on	  between	  them	  is 	  that	  
in	   the 	   case	   of	   a	   merger	   the	   transfer	   occurs 	   from	   one	   ﬁrm	   to	   another,	   whereas	   in	   a	  
priva=za=on	  process 	  the	  transfer	   is 	  made 	  from	  the	  government	   to	  a 	  company.	   Addi=onal	  
issues	  for	  debate 	  raise 	  from	  having	  the	  government	  playing	  the 	  seller’s	  role.	  These 	  issues 	  are	  
largely	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  III.
We	  ask	  ourselves 	  the 	  ques=on	  which	  of	  the	  possible	  mo=ves	  is 	  /	  are	  signiﬁcant	  enough	  to	  
become	   drivers 	  behind	   the	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   and	   convince	   managers 	   engage	   in	   a	  
merger,	   namely,	   determine	   governments 	  to	   prefer	   eﬃciency	   and	   proﬁtability	   instead	   of	  
poli=cal 	  beneﬁts,	  that	  usually	  stand	  behind	  their	  reluctance	  to	  priva=ze,	  and	  sell 	  the	  vo=ng	  /	  
control	  rights	  to	  private	  investors.	  
2. Methodology	  and	  Structure
The	  present	  paper	   is 	  structured	  in	  two	  central 	  parts.	  The 	  ﬁrst	  part	  is 	  theore=cal 	  and	  tackles	  
the	   subject	   of	   mergers 	  and	   acquisi=ons,	   largely	   discussed	   in	   the	  management	   literature	  
beginning	   with	   the	   1950‘s.	   Addi=onally,	   the	   theore=cal 	   framework	   is 	   completed	   by	   the	  
priva=za=on	  issue.	  The	  second	  part	   is 	  empirical	  and	  comes 	  to	  combine	  the	  two	  theore=cal	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frameworks	  with	  the 	  prac=ce.	   The 	  empirical 	  case	  study	   is 	  meant	   to	  helps 	  us 	  beKer	  deﬁne	  
the	  driving	  mo=ves 	  behind	  mergers	  and	  priva=za=ons 	  in	  the	  SCEE	  and	  the	  energy	   sector	   in	  
the	  area.	   The	  case 	  study	   presented	  refers 	  to	   the	  priva=za=on	  of	  a 	  formerly	   state-­‐owned	  
u=lity	  from	  Romania,	  Electrica 	  Moldova	  SA.	  Based	  on	  the	  theore=cal	  background,	  the 	  expert	  
interviews 	  and	  internal 	  company	  data 	  that	  is	  allowed	  to	  be	  disclosed,	  conclusions 	  are	  drawn	  
at	  the	  end.
Chapter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Purpose
Presen&ng	  the	  research	  topic,	  the	  methodology	  and	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  thesis
Classiﬁca&on	  of	  the	  mo&ves	  behind	  M&As	  from	  a	  ﬁnancial	  and	  
strategic	  perspec&ve
Presen&ng	  the	  Priva&za&on	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  ways	  to	  
priva&ze	  and	  the	  governments	  reluctance	  to	  	  proceed	  with	  the	  
process;	  Observing	  the	  ac&vity	  in	  the	  domain	  	  from	  SCEE	  and	  
the	  energy	  sector
Introducing	  the	  two	  companies	  undergoing	  the	  merger	  by	  taking	  
into	  account	  the	  economic,	  industry	  and	  legal	  condi&ons
Describing	  the	  priva&za&on	  steps,	  priva&za&on	  strategy	  and	  the	  




II.	  The	  Ra&onale	  behind	  
M&As
III.	  -­‐	  V.	  The	  Ra&onale	  behind	  
Priva&za&on
VI.	  -­‐	  VII.	  Case	  Study:	  
Merger	  /	  Priva&za&on	  
VIII.	  Case	  Study:	  The	  
Ra&onale	  behind	  the	  
Merger	  /	  Priva&za&on	  of	  
Electrica	  Moldova
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I. The	  RaConale	  behind	  M&As
Mergers 	  have 	  drawn	  the	  aKen=on	  of	  academicians 	  since	  the	  mid	  1950‘s 	  un=l 	  present	  =mes.	  
DePamphilis 	  claims	  that	   the	  ﬁrst	   decade 	  of	  the	  new	  millennium	  heralded	  an	  era 	  of	  global	  
megamergers.	   PaKerns 	  of	  takeover	   ac=vity	   and	  their	   proﬁtability	   vary	   signiﬁcantly	   across	  
M&A	  waves.	   The 	  combina=on	  of	  record	  high	  oil 	  prices	  and	  a	  reduced	  availability	   of	  credit	  
caused	  most	   of	  the 	  world’s 	  economies 	  to	  slip	  into	  recession	  in	  2008.	  Consequently,	   global	  
merger	  ac=vity	  dropped	  precipitously	  in	  the	  same	  year.	  That	  is 	  why,	  governments 	  worldwide	  
have	  intervened	  aggressively	   in	  global 	  credit	   markets	  in	  an	  eﬀort	   to	  restore	  business 	  and	  
consumer	  conﬁdence	  and	  oﬀset	  deﬂa=onary	  pressures.	  
Mergers 	  have	  become	  to	  be	  a	  feature	  of	  corporate	  management	  all 	  over	   the	  world	  and	  of	  
the	  South	  Central 	  Europe 	  as	  well,	  especially	   aNer	   the	  Post-­‐communist	   period.	   Researchers	  
made 	  numerous	  aKempts	  to	  explain	  why	   corporate 	  managers 	  should	  consider	   M&As 	  as	  
strategies	  to	  create	  real	  economic	  value.	  
1. M&As	  CreaCng	  Value	  -­‐	  the	  Financial	  PerspecCve
Most	  recent	  work	  related	  to	  acquisi=ons 	  have	  been	  done 	  in	  the	  ﬁnance	  area	  with	  a	  special	  
care 	  given	  to	   the	  wealth	  gain	  accruing	  to	  shareholders 	  of	   the	  merging	  ﬁrms.	  One 	  way	   to	  
measure	   the 	  wealth	  gain	   is 	   to	   look	  at	   the	  posi=ve	   abnormal	   returns 	  during	   the 	  merger	  
announcement	  period.	  On	  the 	  other	   hand,	   the	  ﬁnance	  literature	  makes 	  a	  clear	  dis=nc=on	  
between	   three 	   possible 	   synergies	   through	   which	   the	   economic	   actors 	   achieve 	   value	  
crea=on.
M&As	   represent	   an	   important	   means 	  of	   transferring	   resources 	   to	  where	   they	   are	  most	  
needed	  and	  removing	  underperforming	  managers,	   thus 	  a	  transfer	   of	  a 	  company’s 	  control.	  
Samuelson	  states	  the	  following:
“Takeovers,	  like	  bankruptcy,	  represent	  one	  of	  nature’s	  methods	  of	  elimina:ng	  deadwood	  in	  
the	  struggle	  for	  survival.	  A	  more	  open	  and	  more	  eﬃciently	  responsive	  corporate	  society	  can	  
result.”	  (Samuelson,	  1970,	  p.505)
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Looking	   from	   a	   ﬁnancial 	   perspec=ve 	  we	   can	   diﬀeren=ate 	   between	   the	   following	   main	  
sources	  of	  value	  crea=on	  through	  M&A:
✓	  opera=ng	  synergies;
✓	  ﬁnancial	  synergies;
✓	  and	  tax	  synergies.
1.1. OperaCng	  Synergies
Opera=ng	   synergies 	  can	  arise	  from	  two	   essen=al	  sources,	   from	   increase	   in 	  revenues	  and	  
from	   cost	   reduc=ons.	   Moreover,	   the	   increase	   in	   revenues 	   can	   be	   realized	   through:	  
improvements 	  in	  distribu=on,	   improvements	  in	  marke=ng,	   improvements	  in	   the 	  product-­‐
mix,	   strategic	   compe==ve	  advantages,	   realiza=on	  of	  monopolis=c	   proﬁts,	   and	  increase	   in	  
management	  eﬃciency.	  Whereas 	  cost	  reduc=ons 	  are 	  achieved	  through:	  economies 	  of	  scale,	  
advantages	   of	   ver=cal 	   integra=on,	   beKer	   u=liza=on	   of	   input	   factors,	   and	   again	   through	  
increase 	  of	  management’s 	  eﬃciency.	  Related	  ﬁrms 	  are 	  more 	  likely	   to	  be	  able	  to	  realize 	  cost	  
savings	  due	  to	  overlapping	  func=ons	  and	  product	  lines	  than	  unrelated	  ﬁrms.
1.2. Financial	  Synergies
Through	  a 	  merger	   a	  ﬁrm	  generally	  appears 	  to	  be	  less 	  risky	  than	  the	  two	  stand-­‐alone	  ﬁrms	  
before	   the 	  merger	   because	   it	   reduces	   the	   cost	   of	   debt.	   What	   happens	   is 	   that	   the	   two	  
formerly	  independent	  ﬁrms 	  end	  up	  guaranteeing	  for	  each	  other.	  An	  internal 	  capital 	  market	  is	  
created,	   which	  would	   allow	   the	   funding	  of	   posi=ve	  net	   present	   value	  projects 	  otherwise	  
diﬃcult	   to	   ﬁnance 	   through	   external	   funds.	   The	   crea=on	   of	   the	   internal 	   capital 	  market	  
represents	  the	  ﬁnancial	  synergy	  per	  se.	  
1.3. Tax	  Synergies
The	   increased	   debt	   capacity	   of	   the 	  merged	   ﬁrm	   results 	   in	   higher	   levels 	  of	   debt,	   which	  
generates	   higher	   tax	   savings.	   The	   higher	   tax	   savings	   represent	   the	   tax	   synergy	   per	   se.	  
Addi=onally,	  there 	  are	  also	  other	  sources 	  to	  achieve 	  tax	  synergies	  such	  as 	  loss 	  carry	  forwards	  
and	  investment	   tax	   credits,	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  oﬀset	  the	  combined	  ﬁrms’	  taxable 	  income.	  
The	  taxable	  nature	  of	  the	  transac=on	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  determining	  if	  the	  merger	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takes 	  place 	  or	   not	  and	  than	  to	  what	  extent	   any	   tax	   beneﬁts	  that	   accrue	  to	   the 	  acquiring	  
company.	   In	  this 	  sense,	   eﬃciency	   implies 	  that	  a 	  target’s 	  share 	  price	  reﬂects 	  accurately	   its	  
true	  economic	  value.	  
1.4. Financing	  M&As	  and	  its	  Value	  CreaCng	  ImplicaCons
The	  acquirer	  ﬁrm	  can	  pay	  for	  the	  target	  ﬁrm	  in	  two	  possible 	  ways.	  It	  is 	  either	  cash	  or	  stock.	  
Depending	   on	   the	   ﬁnancing	   method	   chosen,	   there	   are	   tax	   implica=ons,	   accoun=ng	  
implica=ons,	  capital	  structure	  implica=ons,	  informa=on	  eﬀects	  or	  cost	  eﬀects.	  
The	  success 	  of	  a 	  merger	  or	  acquisi=on	  oNen	  depends	  on	  tax	  implica=ons 	  associated	  with	  the	  
transac=on.	  Transac=on	  taxes 	  are	  lower	  for	  share 	  purchases 	  than	  for	  cash	  purchases.	  Capital	  
gains	  are	  the 	  most	   common	  and	  prevailing	  taxes	  associated	  with	  mergers.	   In	  planning	  an	  
acquisi=on,	  the 	  tax	  structure	  following	  a	  transac=on	  can	  result	  in	  signiﬁcant	  tax	  eﬃciencies.	  
However,	   obtaining	   capital 	   gains 	   tax	   relief	   is 	   diﬃcult	   when	   a	   foreign	   company	   is 	   the	  
acquiring	  ﬁrm.	  Many	   countries 	  allow	  corpora=ons	  to	  ﬁle 	  consolidated	  tax	   returns	  wherein	  
the	  proﬁts	  and	  losses 	  of	  the	  various	  subsidiaries	  are	  pooled.	  Thin	  capitaliza=on	  rules 	  exist	  to	  
discourage 	  foreign	  companies 	  from	  structuring	   local 	  subsidiaries	  with	  high	   levels 	  of	   debt.	  
Viola=on	   of	   an	   established	   debt-­‐to-­‐equity	   ra=o	   oNen	   results 	   in	   the 	   interest	   payments	  
treated	  as 	  a	  de	  facto	  dividend	  payment.	  Ferris 	  and	  Drake	  state 	  that	  lis=ng	  on	  domes=c	  stock	  
exchanges 	  and	   indexes	   requires	   that	   a 	  company	   be	  a 	  domes=c	   corpora=on.	   That	   is	  why	  
many	  companies	  use	  the	  dual-­‐headed	  structure	  as	  an	  ini=al	  merger	  structure.
The	  prepara=on	  of	  consolidated	  ﬁnancial	  results 	  has	  been	  standardized	  in 	  many	  countries 	  to	  
help	   avoid	   the 	   problem	   of	   informa=on	   overload	   by	   investors.	   The	   prepara=on	   of	  
consolidated	   ﬁnancial 	   accoun=ng	   statements 	   provides	   certain	   cost	   savings 	   to	   a 	   parent	  
company.	  Consolidated	  data	  is 	  so	  highly	   aggregated	  that	   it	   is 	  oNen	  diﬃcult	  to	  assess 	  how	  
individual 	  business	  segments 	  are	  actually	  performing.	  When	  an	  acquisi=on	  is 	  executed	  by	  an	  
exchange 	  of	  stock,	  it	  may	  be	  permissible	  to	  account	  for	  the	  transac=on	  as	  a 	  merger	  using	  the	  
pooling-­‐of-­‐interests 	  method.	  This	  means 	  that	  the	  accounts	  of	  the 	  target	  and	  of	  the	  acquirer	  
are 	  simply	  added	  together.	  The	  diﬀerence	  between	  the	  purchase	  price	  and	  the	  book	  value	  of	  
the	  target	   is 	  called	  goodwill 	  on	  the	  merged	  ﬁrm’s	  balance 	  sheet.	  The	  goodwill 	  needs	  to	  be	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amor=zed	  and	   this	  will 	  reduce	  the	   reported	  earnings 	  of	   the	  merged	   ﬁrm.	   (Ferris,	   Drake,	  
2008,	  p.	  160-­‐182)	  
The	  capital 	  structure	  implica=ons 	  for	  a 	  ﬁrm	  that	  plans	  to	  ﬁnance	  the	  project	  with	  cash,	  and	  it	  
does 	  not	  have	  the	  necessary	  internal 	  funds 	  for	  it,	  would	  be	  that	  the	  ﬁrm	  would,	  increase	  the	  
tax	   savings 	  associated	  with	  debt,	   on	  one	  hand	  and	  on	  the 	  other,	   it	   will 	  also	   increase	  the	  
danger	  of	  bankruptcy.	  When	  a 	  ﬁrm	  is	  cash	  constraint	  it	  might	  be	  beKer	  to	  consider	  the	  stock	  
ﬁnancing	  possibility.	  Only	  acquirers	  with	  abundant	  free	  cash	  ﬂows	  should	  use	  cash	  ﬁnancing.
Regarding	   the	   informa=on	   eﬀects,	   if	   the 	   acquirer’s 	   manager	   uses	   stock	   ﬁnancing,	   the	  
company’s 	  stock	  will 	  usually	   drop	  on	  the 	  announcement	  day.	   If	   the	  manager	   believes	  that	  
the	  stock	  is 	  undervalued	  he	  will 	  not	  choose	  this 	  type 	  of	  ﬁnancing	  but	   rather	  go	  for	  a 	  cash	  
oﬀer.	   With	   cash-­‐ﬁnanced	   mergers,	   the 	   stock	   usually	   knows	   a	   small 	   increase	   on	   the	  
announcement	  day.	  
The	  cost	  eﬀects,	  depending	  on	  the	  ﬁnancing	  type,	  relate	  to	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  the	  
target’s 	  value.	   If	   the	   acquirer	   knows	   that	   the	  merger	   is 	  a 	  good	  deal 	  he	  will 	  ﬁnance 	  the	  
project	  with	  cash	  because	  he	  would	  not	  want	  to	  share	  the	  synergy’s 	  beneﬁts.	  In	  this 	  case	  the	  
cost	   of	   the	   acquisi=on	   is 	  given.	  Whereas,	   with	  stock	   ﬁnancing	   the	   cost	   depends	  on	   the	  
target’s 	   value	   and	   remains 	   uncertain	   at	   the	   announcement	   date 	   and	   shortly	   aNer.	  
Integra=on	  frequently	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  more	  challenging	  than	  an=cipated.	  
1.5. PosiCve	  Abnormal	  Returns	  following	  a	  Merger	  
The	   large	   posi=ve	   M&A	   announcement	   date	   returns 	   could	   reﬂect	   an=cipated	   future	  
synergies 	   resul=ng	   from	   the	   combina=on	   of	   the 	   target	   and	   acquiring	   ﬁrms.	   Posi=ve	  
abnormal	   returns	   are	   abnormal 	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   exceed	   what	   an	   investor	   would	  
normally	   expect	   to	  earn	   for	   accep=ng	   a	  certain	   level 	  of	   risk.	   Abnormal	  or	   excess	  returns	  
reﬂect	  the 	  diﬀerence	  between	  the	  premium	  shareholders	  receive	  for	  their	  stock	  and	  what	  is	  
considered	  a 	  normal	  return	  for	  the	  risk	  they	  are 	  assuming.	  The	  bidding	  ﬁrms 	  see	  the	  highest	  
poten=al	  for	  gain	  among	  those	  target	  ﬁrms	  whose	  management	  is	  viewed	  as	  incompetent.	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DePamphilis 	  argues 	  that	   abnormal 	  returns	  to	  acquirer	   shareholders 	  may	  vary	   according	  to	  
type 	  of	  acquirer	   (i.e.,	  publicly	  traded	  or	  private),	  form	  of	  payment	   (i.e.,	  cash	  or	  stock),	  and	  
size	  of	  acquirer	  and	  target.	  Private	  ﬁrms 	  or	  subsidiaries 	  of	  public	  ﬁrms 	  are 	  more	  likely	   to	  be	  
acquired	  at	   a	  discount	   from	   their	   actual 	  economic	   value 	  than	  public	   ﬁrms.	   Bidding	  ﬁrms	  
using	  cash	  to	  purchase	  the 	  target	  ﬁrm	  exhibit	  beKer	   long-­‐term	  performance	  than	  do	  those	  
using	  stock.	  Larger	  deals	  may	  oﬀer	  signiﬁcant	  posi=ve	  abnormal	  rates	  of	  returns.	  
2. M&As	  CreaCng	  Value	  -­‐	  the	  Strategic	  PerspecCve
The	  managerial 	  strategic	   perspec=ve	  to	  M&As	  completes	  the	  ﬁnancial 	  one.	   It	   adds 	  other	  
possible 	  synergy	  eﬀects 	  that	  stand	  behind	  the 	  ra=onale	  for	  merging.	  Moreover,	  the 	  strategic	  
management	  literature	  goes 	  into	  more	  detail 	  in	  the	  case	  of	  opera=ng	  synergies 	  by	  analyzing	  
them	  from	  resource-­‐base	  and	  transac=on	  cost-­‐based	  points	  of	  view	  as	  well.	  
The	  synergy	  concept	  was 	  ini=ally	  discussed	  by	  Penrose,	  in	  1959,	  who	  dis=nguished	  between	  
the	  possibility	   of	  sharing	  managerial 	  resources,	  and	  the	  transfer	   of	  excess	  capacity.	   Porter	  
agrees	  with	  her,	  in	  1987,	  and	  moreover,	  he	  states 	  that	  these	  two	  types	  of	  synergies	  are	  the	  
only	   ones	  a 	  ﬁrm	  knows,	   though	  this 	  statement	  has	  been	  later	  proven	  to	  be	  too	  narrow	   in	  
scope.	   Then,	   the 	  concept	  was	  further	  developed	  by	  Ansoﬀ,	   in 	  1965,	   when	  he	  talks	  about	  
four	  diﬀerent	  types 	  of	  synergies:	  sales	  synergies,	  opera=ng	  synergies,	  investment	  synergies,	  
and	  managerial	  synergies.
Today,	  numerous 	  theories 	  about	  M&As’	  value	  crea=on	  poten=al 	  have 	  appeared	  in	  the	  ﬁeld	  
of	  management	  and	  economics.	  By	   studying	  mergers	  from	  a 	  strategical 	  point	   of	  view	  and	  
through	  diﬀerent	  theore=cal	  lenses	  we	  conclude	  that	  value	  crea=on	  derives	  from:
✓	  opera=ng	  synergies	  in	  produc=on,	  R&D,	  and	  administra=on;
✓	  collusive	  synergies	  from	  market	  and	  purchasing	  power;
✓	  managerial	  synergies.	  
✓	  and	  ﬁnancial	  synergies.	  (Larsson,	  Finkelstein,	  1999)	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2.1. OperaCng	  Synergies	  in	  ProducCon,	  R&D,	  and	  AdministraCon
Considering	  the 	  resource-­‐based	  view,	  ﬁrms 	  oNen	  take	  the	  decision	  to	  diversify	   and	  expand	  
to	   be 	   able 	   to	   exploit	   the 	   “pool 	   of	   unused	   produc=ve	   services,	   resources,	   and	   special	  
knowledge”	  that	  comes	  from	  the	  rou=niza=on	  of	  ac=vi=es.	  It	  is 	  an	  expression	  of	  using	  excess	  
capacity.	  On	  another	  market	  the	  same	  resource	  might	  be	  needed	  more	  or	  even	  worth	  more.	  
It	  is 	  usually	  the	  case	  of	  intangible	  resources,	  such	  as 	  R&D	  skills	  or	  administra=ve 	  know-­‐how,	  
that	  are 	  not	  speciﬁc	   to	  a 	  certain	  industry.	   Typically	   no	  signiﬁcant	  costs	  are 	  associated	  with	  
their	  incremental 	  use.	  The 	  opportunity	  that	  arises 	  from	  exploi=ng	  the	  excess 	  capacity	  of	  this	  
resources	   is 	  one	   important	   explana=on	   to	  why	   ﬁrms 	  decide	   to	   merge.	   In	   this 	   scenario,	  
another	  possible 	  alterna=ve	  to	  mergers 	  would	  be	  ﬁrm-­‐speciﬁc	  investment	  or	  investments 	  in	  
sunk	  assets,	  but	  this	  would	  only	  generate	  addi=onal	  unwanted	  transac=on	  costs.
2.2. Collusive	  Synergies	  from	  Market	  and	  Purchasing	  Power
Mergers 	  that	  happen	  in	  the	  same	  industry	  when	  a	  ﬁrm	  spots	  the	  produc=vity	  opportunity	  in	  
acquiring	   another,	   usually	   has 	  as 	  a	   follow-­‐up	   an	   increase	   in	   the 	  market	   share.	   Having	   a	  
higher	  market	  share	  enables	  the	  acquirer	  to	  achieve 	  higher	  market	  power	  and	  a 	  compe==ve	  
advantage	  in	  comparison	  with	  other	  similar	  companies.	  Such	  a	  posi=on	  might	  allow	  the	  ﬁrm	  
to	  charge	  higher	   prices 	  to	  consumers 	  or	   nego=ate	  too	   low	  input	   prices 	  with	  suppliers.	  To	  
avoid	  this 	  certain	  an=-­‐trust	   compe==on	   laws 	  forbid	  ﬁrms	  to	   achieve	  such	  a 	  monopolis=c	  
posi=on	  which	  could	  turn	  into	  an	  an=social	  ac=vity.	  
2.3. Managerial	  Synergies
When	   a	   ﬁrm	   with	   superior	   management	   takes	   over	   a	   ﬁrm	   with	   many	   management	  
ineﬃciencies,	   the	   shareholders	   of	   the	   target	   ﬁrm	   enjoy	   synergis=c	   gains 	   from	   either	  
achieving	  a	  beKer	  coordina=on	  of	  the 	  assets 	  following	  the 	  merger,	  or	  from	  the 	  control 	  shiN	  
of	   the	   ﬁrm’s 	  assets 	  to	   a 	  management	   that	   is 	  more	  eﬀec=ve.	   	   The 	  eﬀec=veness 	  of	   one	  
management	  structure	  can	  be 	  a	  func=on	  of	  higher	  know-­‐how	  or	  stronger	   incen=ves 	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  crea=ng	  value	  and	  maximizing	  proﬁtability.	  (Slutsky,	  Caves,	  1999)
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II. The	  RaConale	  behind	  PrivaCzaCon
Half	   a 	  century	   ago	   the	  economists 	  were	   quick	   to	   be	   in	   favor	   of	   government	   ownership	  
whenever	   a	  market	  imperfec=on	  like 	  monopoly	  power	  arose	  or	  was 	  even	  suspected.	  Even	  
the	  laissez-­‐faire	  economists 	  overwhelmingly	  accepted	  this 	  approach	  because 	  the	  supreme	  
goal	  of	  achieving	  compe==ve	  prices	  was	  at	  stake.	  Thus,	  in	  1934,	  Henry	  Simons	  said:
“The	  state	  should	  face	  the	  necessity	  of	  actually	  taking	  over,	  owing	  and	  managing	  directly,	  
both	  the	  railroads	  and	  the	  u:li:es,	  and	  all	  other	  industries	  in	  which	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  maintain	  
eﬀec:vely	  compe::ve	  condi:ons“.	  (Simons,	  1934,	  p.	  50-­‐51)
Only	   a 	  few	   years	   later,	   Samuelson	  appeared	   less 	  conﬁdent	   in	   the 	  beneﬁts 	  of	   a	   socialist	  
system:	  
“It	  is	  too	  easy	  to	  gloss	  over	  the	  tremendous	  dynamic	  vitality	  of	  our	  mixed	  free	  enterprise	  
system,	  which,	  with	  all	  his	  faults,	  has	  given	  the	  world	  a	  century	  of	  progress	  such	  as	  an	  actual	  
socialized	  order	  might	  ﬁnd	  it	  impossible	  to	  equal”.	  (Samuelson,	  1948,	  p.604)
A	  lot	  has	  changed	  since 	  then!	  Nowadays,	  governments 	  throughout	  the 	  world	  adopt	  reforms	  
that	  have	  priva=za=on	  as 	  a	  central 	  focus 	  for	  their	  sustainable	  development.	  According	  to	  the	  
World	   Bank,	   evidence	   of	   the 	   failures	   of	   state	   ownership	   on	   a	   global	   level 	   con=nue	   to	  
accumulate,	   so	   that	   the	   theories 	  regarding	   ownership	   and	   the	   ques=on	   of	   state 	  versus	  
private	  provision	  are	  of	  pivotal 	  research	  interest	  again.	  In	  this 	  view,	  it	  all 	  dates 	  back	  to	  Coase	  
(1937)	  and	  his 	  “make	  or	  buy	   decision”,	  except	  this 	  =me	  the	  private 	  ﬁrm	  is 	  no	  longer	   in	  the	  
middle	  point	  of	  the	  discussion,	  but	  rather	  the	  government.
Gerald	  Roland	  calls 	  priva=za=on	   “the 	  greatest	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   in	  the 	  history	   of	  the	  
corpora=on”	   in	  his 	  book	  en=tled	   “Priva=za=on,	   Successes 	  and	  Failures”.	   The 	  ﬁrst	  wave 	  of	  
priva=za=ons	  began	  in	  the 	  ‘80s,	  con=nued	  during	  the	  ‘90s,	  and	  as 	  it	  is 	  a 	  major	  component	  of	  
market	   liberaliza=on	  reforms 	  s=ll 	  con=nues	  today,	  despite	  the 	  current	  bad	  outlook	  in	  equity	  
markets.	  Bortollo=	  deﬁned	  priva=za=on	  as 	  the	  process 	  through	  which	  governments 	  all 	  over	  
the	  world	  sell 	  “large	  chunks	  of	   their	  ownership	  in	  corpora=ons	  to	  the	  private	  sector”.	   This	  
change	  in	  ownership	  has 	  greatly	  reduced	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state 	  in	  many	  na=onal 	  economies.	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Consequently,	   an	  event	   as 	  profound	   as 	  priva=za=on	  has	  raised	   important	   ques=ons 	  and	  
thus,	  has	  been	  the	  central	  topic	  for	  debate	  of	  many	  research	  papers	  in	  the	  last	  years.	  
The	  priva=za=on	  process,	   which	  has 	  become	  a	  common	  global 	  trend,	   varies	  considerably	  
across 	   industries 	   and	   countries.	   Some	   countries 	   pursue	   a 	   sustained	   and	   consistent	  
priva=za=on	  policy	  as 	  an	  important	  point	  in	  the 	  reform	  program,	  while 	  others	  block	  the	  free	  
access 	  of	  foreign	  investors 	  only	  to	  small 	  interest	  groups,	  thus 	  registering	  weak	  and	  sporadic	  
ac=vity	   in	   this	   domain.	   The 	  ﬁrst	   example 	   is 	  the 	  case	  of	   the 	  United	   Kingdom	  where 	  the	  
process	  was	  ﬁrst	   sustained	   by	   Mrs.	   Thatcher	   and	   then	   the	  divesture	  of	   SOEs 	  became	  a	  
priority	  of	  the 	  poli=cal 	  manifesto,	  allowing	  the	  Conserva=ves 	  to	  be	  re-­‐elected	  in	  1987.	  The	  
second	  example 	  refers 	  to	  the	  case 	  of	  Belgium	  where 	  Prime	  Minister	  Martens 	  was	  severely	  
contested	  by	   the 	  trade	  unions 	  at	  his 	  aKempts 	  to	  restructure 	  and	  dena=onalize 	  the	  public	  
sector.	  
1. Ways	  to	  PrivaCze




• and	  Voucher	  priva=za=ons.
In	   general,	   through	   an	   asset	   sale	   the	   government	   sells 	   the	   ownership	   of	   state 	   owned	  
enterprises 	  to	  private 	  investors 	  and	  small	  groups 	  of	  people.	  An	  auc=on	  is	  organized	  in	  most	  
of	   the	   cases,	   although	   some=mes 	   the	   government	   decides	   to	   sell 	   directly	   to	   private	  
investors.
Alterna=vely,	  the	  government	  can	  decide 	  to	  sell 	  SOEs	  in	  share-­‐issue	  priva=za=ons	  (SIPs).	   In	  
this 	  case	  what	  the 	  government	  does	  is 	  to	  oﬀer	  equity	  shares	  to	  the	  public,	  to	  both	  retail 	  and	  
ins=tu=onal 	  investors.	   	  This	  is 	  the	  most	  common	  form	  of	  priva=za=on	  known	  because	  it	  is	  
the	  largest	  and	  most	  signiﬁcantly	  relevant.
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Voucher	  priva=za=ons 	  are 	  usually	   typical 	  for	  former	  Communist	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  
and	  it	  is 	  a	  way	  of	  making	  the 	  ci=zens 	  become 	  owners	  of	  state’s 	  assets.	  These	  rights 	  are	  given	  
for	  free	  or	   sold	  at	  very	   low	  prices.	  Priva=za=on	  took	  this	  form	  in	  the	  Communist	  countries	  
(and	  formerly	   Communist)	  because	  SIPs	  were	  poli=cally	   unacceptable.	   Low	   income	  levels	  
and	  unequal 	  distribu=on	  of	  it	   are	  two	  important	  characteris=cs 	  that	   should	  be	  taken	   into	  
account	  here.	  In	  this	  view,	  only	  individuals 	  with	  wealth	  were 	  able 	  to	  acquire	  them	  and	  these	  
were	  oNen	  “Communists,	  criminals,	  and	  foreigners”.	  (Parker,	  Saal,	  2003,	  p.34)
2. Factors	  that	  aﬀect	  the	  Government’s	  Decision	  when	  Choosing	  the	  Way	  to	  
PrivaCze
The	   most	   common	   factors 	   that	   determine 	   the	   choice	   of	   the	   priva=za=on	  method	   are:	  
market	  and	  poten=al	  investors 	  considera=ons;	  poli=cal 	  and	  legal 	  environment;	  and	  ﬁrm	  and	  
industry	   characteris=cs.	  Several 	  of	   these	  factors	  might	  be 	  inﬂuen=al 	  in	  ways 	  impossible 	  to	  
predict	  ex-­‐ante.
When	   considering	   the	   market	   characteris=cs,	   two	   subsequent	   factors	   inﬂuence	  
governments	   in 	   their	   decisions,	   namely:	   the	   current	   level	   of	   market	   valua=on	   and	   the	  
development	   level 	  of	   the	  country’s 	  capital 	  market.	   There	  are 	  periods 	  more	   favorable 	  to	  
priva=ze	  than	  others,	  such	  as	  the	  high	  valua=on	  periods 	  or	  “hot	  markets”	  (Megginson,	  Nash,	  
NeKer,	  Poulsen,	  2000).	  Then,	  governments 	  would	  in	  this 	  case	  prefer	   to	  priva=ze	  using	  SIP1.	  
Consequently,	   in	   countries	  with	   less 	  developed	   capital	  markets,	   governments	  may	   favor	  
priva=zing	   by	   asset	   sales	   due 	   to	   higher	   underpricing	   and	   uncertainty	   about	   the 	   SOE’s	  
intrinsic	  value.	  Addi=onally,	  it	  has 	  been	  argued	  that	  the 	  priva=za=on	  programs	  using	  SIPs 	  can	  
be	  used	  as	  a 	  tool 	  to	  jumpstart	  stock-­‐market	  development	  by	  encouraging	  more	  ﬁrms	  to	  go	  
public.	  2
If	  the	  poli=cal	  and	  legal	  environment	   is 	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that	  it	  greatly	  protects 	  the 	  private	  
property	   rights,	  then	  the	  state’s 	  oﬃcials 	  would	  consider	   an	  asset	  sale 	  type	  of	  priva=za=on.	  
On	   the 	  other	   hand,	   this 	  is 	  a 	  risky	   decision	   for	   the	  buyers 	  of	   SOEs,	   because	   it	   holds 	  no	  
guarantee	   to	   them	   that	   the	  next	   government	   will 	  not	   rena=onalize 	  the 	  enterprise	   in	  the	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1	  Share-­‐issue	  Priva&za&ons
2	  It	  creates	  a	  so-­‐called	  “snow-­‐ball”	  eﬀect	  on	  the	  capital	  market.	  (Megginson,	  Nash,	  NeUer,	  Poulsen,	  2000)	  
future	  or	   change	   its 	  priva=za=on	  policy.	   They	   would	  unques=onably	   prefer	   a 	  SIP	   type	  of	  
priva=za=on	  because 	  it	  creates 	  thousands 	  of	  ci=zen	  investors,	  and	  induces 	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  
government	  will	  incur	  substan=al	  poli=cal	  costs	  should	  it	  tried	  to	  rena=onalize.
The	  ﬁrm-­‐speciﬁc	  characteris=cs 	  can	  greatly	  aﬀect	  the	  government’s 	  decision	  to	  priva=ze	  and	  
the	  method.	  Informa=on	  asymmetry	  surrounding	  the 	  uncertainty	   regarding	  SOEs	  value,	  the	  
ﬁrm’s	  size 	  and	  the 	  post-­‐divestment	  performance	  are	  the	  three	  most	   important	  indices 	  that	  
the	  government	  and	  investors	  take	  into	  account	  when	  engaging	  in	  the	  priva=za=on	  process.	  
On	   the 	   other	   hand,	   the 	   industry-­‐speciﬁc	   characteris=cs	   also	   play	   an	   important	   role.	  
Therefore,	   governments 	  may	   be	   more 	   likely	   to	   priva=ze 	  SOEs	   belonging	   to	   strategically	  
important	  industries	  through	  an	  asset	  sale.
3. Reluctance	  to	  PrivaCze
When	   faced	  with	   the	   priva=zing	   decision,	   governments 	  are 	  reluctant	   to	   lose	   the 	  power	  
control 	  and	  vo=ng	  rights 	  to	  the	  private 	  sector.	  Usually,	   there 	  is 	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  priva=zing	  
with	  enthusiasm.	  This 	  is 	  especially	   true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Italy.	  Even	  though	  Italy	   occupies	  the	  
third	  place	  in	  the	  world	  for	   the	  intense	  priva=za=on	  ac=vity,	   the 	  Italian	  government	   is 	  s=ll	  
the	  largest	  shareholder	  in	  several	  priva=zed	  ﬁrms.	  
The	   government’s	   reluctance	   to	   priva=ze	  manifests 	  itself	   the	  most	   in	   the	   case	  of	   basic,	  
strategic	   industries 	  such	  as 	  the	  energy	   sector.	  Studies 	  carried	  from	  OECD3 	   countries	  show	  
that,	  aNer	  a 	  priva=za=on,	  77.1%	  of	  the 	  priva=zed	  u=li=es 	  have	  the	  government	  as 	  the 	  largest	  
shareholder.	  (Bortoloz,	  Faccio,	  2004)
Trade	   unions	   around	   the 	   world	   are 	   typically	   one	   of	   the 	   strongest	   opponents 	   when	   a	  
priva=za=on	  opportunity	  comes	  along.	  Their	  members 	  enjoy	  various 	  beneﬁts 	  from	  SOEs 	  for	  
oﬀering	  their	   support	   in	  elec=ons	  and	  even	  have	  the	  power	   to	  bring	  down	  a 	  government.	  
Subsequently,	   the	  unions’	   job	   is 	  to	   protect	   employment.	  Most	   oNen,	   the	  priva=za=on	  of	  
state	  enterprises 	  comes 	  along	   with	   strict	   restructuring	   plans 	  to	   pursue	   improvements	   in	  
produc=vity	  and	  proﬁtability	  which	  may	  imply	  the	  reduc=on	  of	  employment	  rates.
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3	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  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐Opera&on	  and	  Development
4. The	  Government	  -­‐	  A	  Bad	  Owner	  of	  Companies
The	  ﬁrst	  order	  reasons 	  to	  priva=ze	  are 	  generally	   budgetary	  constraint	  or	  external 	  pressure.	  
The	   external 	   pressure	   can	   either	   be 	   exercised	   by	   lending	   agencies 	   or	   interna=onal	  
ins=tu=ons.	   Other	   possible	   reasons,	   would	   be	   the	   ineﬃciency	   of	   SOE	   or	   management	  
failure,	  also	  exist.	  It	  is 	  oNen	  the	  case	  that	  these	  state 	  owned	  companies	  are	  run	  to	  achieve	  
poli=cal 	  objec=ves,	   notably	   by	   increasing	   employment	   rates 	  and	  maximize 	  social 	  welfare	  
rather	  than	  pursuing	  the 	  maximiza=on	  of	  proﬁtability.	  In	  this 	  view,	  the	  priva=za=on	  solu=on	  
comes 	  as 	  the	  next	   best	   natural 	  solu=on	  and	  makes 	  an	  ownership	  and	   control 	  transfer	   to	  
outside	  investors	  whose	  only	   interest	   is 	  to	  get	   the 	  highest	   rents 	  for	   their	   investment,	  and	  
thus 	  achieve	  eﬃciency.	  (Shleifer,	  Vishny,	  1994)	  Other	  reasons	  to	  why	  the	  government	  should	  
switch	  from	  public	  to	  private	  provision	  are	  the	  high	  innova=ve 	  poten=al	  of	  entrepreneurial	  
ﬁrms	  and	  their	  capability	  to	  deliver	  higher	  quality	  products	  at	  compe==ve	  costs.
There	  is	  only	  a 	  limited	  set	  of	  circumstances	  when	  the 	  government	  ownership	  is	  superior	  to	  
private	  ownership,	  namely	  when:	  
1. “the	  opportuni=es 	  for	  cost	  reduc=on	  that	  lead	  to	  non-­‐contrac=ble	  
deteriora=on	  of	  quality	  are	  signiﬁcant;
2. innova=on	  is	  rela=vely	  unimportant;
3. compe==on	  is	  weak	  and	  consumer	  choice	  is	  ineﬀec=ve;
4. and	  reputa=onal	  mechanisms	  are	  also	  weak.”	  (Shleifer,	  1998)
	  As 	  the 	  researcher	  himself	  argued,	  the	  above	  circumstances 	  would	  only	  prove 	  again	  just	  how	  
“tenuous”	  the	  government	  produc=on	  is.	   Just	  to	  point	  out	   the	  rareness 	  of	  such	  a 	  situa=on	  
consider	   the	   case	   of	   opera=ng	   Air	   Force 	   One,	   the	   airplane	   responsible	   to	   service 	   the	  
President	  of	  the	  United	  States.
5. The	  PoliCcal	  Pressure	  -­‐	  A	  reason	  for	  Ineﬃciency	  
Bortoloz,	  Siniscalo	  and	  Fan=ni 	  (2003)	  discuss	  the	  eﬀects	  the	  poli=cal 	  inﬂuence 	  has 	  on	  ﬁrms	  
and	  their	   eﬃciency.	  It	  is 	  mostly	   argued	  that	  priva=za=on	  is 	  more	  likely	   to	  be	  implemented	  
when	  there	  is 	  a 	  low	  level 	  of	  corrup=on.	  By	  itself,	  it	  is 	  a	  tool	  in 	  the	  reformers’	  hands 	  to	  restrict	  
governments	  from	  spending	   and	  helps	  eliminate	  poli=cally	  mo=vated	  resource	  alloca=on.	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Thus,	  the	  corrup=on	  considera=on	  becomes	  vital 	  when	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  state 	  versus	  
private	  ownership	  and	  further	  reduces	  the	  op=mal	  range	  of	  government	  ownership.
There	  is 	  also	  oNen	  the 	  case	  when	  poli=cians 	  and	  managers 	  bargain	  endlessly	   over	   power	  
beneﬁts 	   instead	   of	   eﬃciently	   alloca=ng	   the	   resources.	   Their	   rela=onship	   is	   governed	   by	  
contract	   incompleteness 	  instead	  of	  incen=ve	  contracts,	  and	  thus	  they	   spend	  precious	  =me	  
on	  bargaining	  over	  the	  residual	  rights	  of	  control.	   In	  this 	  context,	  the	  ques=on	  that	  arises	  is:	  
how	  would	  private	  ownership	  make	  a 	  diﬀerence?	  The	  right	  answer	  to	  this 	  ques=on	  is 	  that	  
with	  full 	  corrup=on	  priva=za=on	  does 	  not	  maKer.	  The 	  alloca=on	  of	  control	  rights 	  and	  cash	  
ﬂow	  rights 	  does 	  not	  inﬂuence	  resource	  alloca=on	  with	  full 	  corrup=on.	  	  The 	  corrup=on	  issue	  
related	   to	   successful 	  priva=za=on	   is	   a 	  severe 	  problem	   especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Eastern	  
European	  Countries.
Even	  though	  poli=cians 	  follow	  their	  own	  incen=ves 	  and	  are	  highly	   reluctant	  to	  priva=ze	  we	  
see 	  intense 	  ac=vity	   in	  this 	  sense,	   even	  in	  geographical 	  areas 	  like	  SCEE.	   Following	  this,	   we	  
would	  logically	  ask	  ourselves	  why	  ra=onal	  poli=cians	  ever	  agree	  to	  priva=ze?	  This 	  is 	  due	  to	  
compe==on	  between	  two	  types	  of	  poli=cians 	  stemming	  from	  diﬀerent	  mo=ves:	  there	  exist	  
those	  who	  receive	  beneﬁts 	  from	   government	   spending	   and	  bribes,	   and	  then	  others 	  that	  
beneﬁt	  from	  low	  taxes.	  Thus,	  priva=za=on	  happens 	  when	  democra=c	  governments 	  replace	  
leN	  wing,	   communist	  governments.	  The	  democra=c	   governments 	  represent	   the 	  interest	  of	  
the	  tax	  payers 	  and	  the 	  communist	  ones 	  are	  favored	  by	  public	  employees.	  Addi=onally,	  it	  has	  
been	  proven	   that	  majoritarian	   poli=cal 	  systems,	   as 	  opposed	   to	  propor=onal 	  systems,	   are	  
more	  likely	  to	  priva=ze.
6. Private	  Ownership	  has	  its	  Costs
Minority	   shareholders’s 	  interests 	  are	  at	   stake 	  since	   they	   are	  exposed	   to	   expropria=on	  of	  
management	   and	   controlling	   creditors.	   Addi=onally,	   concentra=on	   of	   ownership	   creates	  
opportunity	   for	   large 	  shareholders 	  to	   extract	   private	   beneﬁts 	  at	   the	  expense	   of	   outside	  
investors.	   (Jensen,	   Meckling,	   1976;	   Shleifer,	   Vishny,	   1986)	   In	   this 	   respect,	   a 	   residual	  
government	   stake	  in	  a	  priva=zed	  company	   can	  be	  beneﬁcial 	  because 	  the	  government	  can	  
aﬀord	  favorable	  treatment	  to	  companies	  by	  subsidizing	  loans 	  or	  guaranteeing	  contracts.	  By	  
using	  this 	  measure	  governments	  shield	  priva=zed	  companies	  from	  compe==on.	  This 	  is 	  oNen	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the	  case	  of	  former	   state	  monopolies	  opera=ng	  in	  the	  energy	   sector	   (e.g.	   u=li=es),	  who	  are	  
thought	  to	  be	  strategically	  signiﬁcant	  for	  the	  na=onal 	  welfare	  and	  are 	  consequently	  granted	  
these	  monopolis=c	  rents.
III. PrivaCzaCon	  in	  SCEE
Priva=za=on,	  by	  itself,	  represents	  an	  ideological 	  and	  symbolic	  “break”	  with	  a 	  history	  of	  state	  
control 	  over	  a 	  country's	  products 	  and	  assets.	  In 	  this	  view,	  this	  symbolism	  and	  its 	  eﬀects	  are	  
the	  most	  apparent	   in	  the	  economies	  of	  Eastern	  European	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union,	  where	  
priva=za=on	  of	  state 	  owned	  enterprises 	  (SOEs)	  “has	  come	  to	  signal 	  a 	  na=on's	  transi=on	  from	  
communism	  to	  democra=c	  capitalism”.	  (Megginson,	  2000)
Priva=za=on	   was	   an	   uncommon	   prac=ce	   during	   the 	   Communist	   period	   due	   to	   poli=cal	  
reasons 	   and	   the	   na=onaliza=on	   policy	   following	   various 	   ideologies.	   The	   Communist	  
governments	  came	  to	  own	  en=re 	  economies 	  for	  the 	  purpose	  of	  keeping	  the	  ruling	  dictators	  
in	  oﬃce.	  They	  were 	  also	  engaged	  in	  planning	  nearly	  all 	  resources,	  and	  controlling	  the 	  people	  
through	  monopsony	  over	  employment.	  
One	  signiﬁcant	  par=cularity	  that	  makes 	  the	  diﬀerence	  between	  Western	  European	  countries	  
and	  the	  SCEE	   is 	  the 	  fact	   that	   in	  the	  West,	   SOEs	  usually	   operate 	  in	  only	   a 	  few	  sectors 	  and	  
diﬀer	  systema=cally	   from	  other	  ﬁrms.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  the 	  SCEE	  countries 	  operate 	  in	  nearly	  all	  
sectors.	  Addi=onally,	  we	  no=ce 	  the 	  dis=nc=on	  of	   careful 	  selec=on	  along	  the	  priva=za=on	  
process	  in	  the	  West,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  rapid	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  and	  in	  a 	  short	  period	  of	  
=me	   for	   the	  SOEs 	  priva=zed	  in	   SCEE.	   Moreover,	   Uhlenbruck	  and	  De 	  Castro	   (2000)	   found	  
substan=al 	   diﬀerences	   in	   organiza=onal 	   structure,	   management	   culture,	   and	   human	  
resource	  policies 	  between	  Western	  acquirers 	  and	  SOEs	  in	  formerly	   Communist	  countries 	  in	  
SCEE.	  
In	   this 	  sense,	   the	   transi=on	   economies 	  of	   South	  Central	   and	   Eastern	  Europe	  oﬀer	   good	  
grounds 	  on	  which	  to	  test	  and	  reﬁne	  the	  exis=ng	  management	  theories	  and	  the 	  tradi=onal	  
views 	  on	   mergers 	   and	   acquisi=ons.	   A	   couple	   of	   other	   addi=onal 	   factors	   related	   to	   the	  
speciﬁcity	  of	  the 	  region	  have 	  to	  be	  considered,	  not	  just	  the	  mere	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  from	  
public	   to	  private	  sector.	   In	  priva=za=on	  the	  government	   is 	  the	  seller	   and	   its 	  interests 	  go	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beyond	  economic	   concerns 	  (e.g	  maximiza=on	  of	  proﬁtability).	   The	  economic	   concerns	  do	  
not	   surpass 	   the 	   poli=cal	   and	   social 	   ones	   (e.g	   employment	   rate,	   labor	   union’s 	   poli=cal	  
support).	   Moreover,	   unlike	   in	   a	   tradi=onal 	  M&A	   process,	   the 	   government	   can	   enforce	  
condi=ons 	  aNer	  the	  acquisi=on	  due	  to	  its 	  power	  to	  control 	  many	  of	  the 	  country’s 	  resources	  
and	  distribu=on	  channels	  or	  because	  it	  might	  be	  the	  SOEs	  most	  important	  customer.
In	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  the	  ra=onale	  behind	  priva=za=on	  is:	  
➡ the	  scope	  of	  reducing	  the	  government’s	  inﬂuence	  in	  the	  economies 4;
➡ achieving	  eﬃcient	  capital	  markets	  /	  developing	  them;
➡ need	  for	  entrepreneurial	  and	  managerial	  skills;
➡ need	  for	  technology	  skills;
➡ need	  for	  marke=ng	  skills;
➡ achieving	  produc=vity	  and	  corporate	  performance;
➡ cost	  reduc=on	  considera=ons.
1. PrivaCzaCon	  and	  Merger	  Frameworks:	  Evidence	  on	  Performance	  from	  SCEE
In	  combining	  the	  two	  frameworks:	  priva=za=on	  and	  mergers,	  strategic	  and	  organiza=onal 	  ﬁt	  
together	   with	   ﬁrm	   transforma=on	   have 	  to	   be 	  taken	   into	   account.	   Also	   signiﬁcant	   is	   that	  
M&As	   in	   formerly	   Communist	   countries	   involve	  much	   higher	   risks 	  than	   those 	  of	   typical	  
mergers.	  The	  problems 	  appear	  due	  to	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  valua=on	  of	  the 	  target	  companies,	  
as	  well	  as	  poli=cal	  and	  economic	  risks.
The	  management	   literature	  deﬁnes 	  a	  strategic	   ﬁt	   of	   the	  situa=on	  where	   the 	  an=cipated	  
merger	   beneﬁts 	  of	   the	  acquirer	   are	   based	  on	  the	   asset	   and	   complemen=ng	   opera=onal	  
eﬀect	   of	   the	  merging	   companies.	   In	   this	  view,	   the	  main	  mo=ve	  for	   merging	  with	  Eastern	  
European	  SOEs 	  is	  the	  acquisi=on	  of	  opera=onal 	  synergies 	  by	  building	  upon	  trade	  rela=ons 	  or	  
lower	  costs	  associated	  with	  the	  priva=zed	  ﬁrms.	  (ChaKerjee,	  1986)	  Outsourcing	  comes 	  as	  an	  
addi=onal 	  mo=ve	   for	   foreign	   investment	   in	   the	   area	   and	   this 	  mo=ve	   is	   strictly	   =ed	   to	  
industry-­‐speciﬁc	  ﬁrm	  capabili=es 	  and	  the	  acquirer’s	  industry	  know-­‐how.	  This 	  is 	  why	  industry	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4	  During	  the	  1980s,	  the	  state’s	  share	  of	  produc&on	  was	  approximately	  80%	  in	  the	  CEE.	  (Uhlenbruck,	  De	  Castro,	  
2000)
and	  ver=cal	  relatedness 	  between	  the 	  merging	  ﬁrms 	  is 	  posi=vely	  correlated	  with	  the	  SOEs’	  
post-­‐priva=za=on	  performance.
Organiza=onal	  ﬁt	  means 	  primarily	  the	  similarity	  in	  organiza=onal 	  culture,	  management	  style,	  
control 	  and	  reward	  mechanisms,	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  emerging	  ﬁrms.	  The	  most	  cri=cal 	  aspect	  
of	   all,	   which	  makes	  the	  uniﬁca=on	  more	  diﬃcult	   and	   the 	  transi=on	  more	  painful,	   is 	  the	  
diﬀerence	  in	  the	  reward	  and	  control 	  policies 	  between	  the	  acquirer	  and	  the	  target.	  However,	  
Uhlenbruck	  and	  De	  Castro	  (2000)	  argue	  that	   the	  similari=es 	  in	   control 	  and	  compensa=on	  
schemes 	  of	  merging	  companies	  are,	  surprisingly,	  nega=vely	  correlated	  with	  the	  SOEs’	  post-­‐
priva=za=on	   performance.	   This 	   highlights 	   the	   unique 	   characteris=cs 	   of	   priva=za=on	  
acquisi=ons.	  A	  logical 	  explana=on	  to	  this 	  ﬁnding	  would	  be	  that	  managers 	  of	  SOEs 	  from	  SCEE	  
countries 	  followed	  goals	  other	  than	  ﬁnancial 	  performance	  (e.g	  minimizing	  inputs	  for	  a	  given	  
volume	  of	  output).	  Cross-­‐cultural	  studies 	  show	  that	  mo=va=ons	  and	  goals	  of	  managers	  diﬀer	  
from	  one	  culture	  to	  another.	  (Hofstede,	  1980)	  
The	  integra=on,	  and	  thus 	  transforma=on	  process 	  of	  the	  recent	   acquired	  SOE	  would	  imply	  
considerable	   eﬀorts	   and	   immense 	   costs	   on	   the 	   acquirer’s	   side 	   to	   improve 	   the 	   target’s	  
processes 	  and	  technology.	  Consequently,	   this	  requires 	  large 	  investments.	   Investment	   level	  
becomes	  a	  way	  to	  measure	  and	  reﬂect	  the 	  intensity	  of	  the 	  ﬁrms’	  ac=ons 	  in	  the	  integra=on	  
process.	  In	  terms 	  of	  performance,	  it	  has 	  been	  proven	  that	  investments	  in	  the	  transforma=on	  
process	  of	  SOEs 	  are 	  posi=vely	  correlated	  with	  post-­‐priva=za=on	  performance.	   (Uhlenbruck,	  
De	  Castro,	  2000)
The	  government	   involvement	   is 	  another	  key	  determinant	  of	  foreign	  direct	   investment	  with	  
the	  purpose	  of	  acquiring	  SOEs 	  from	  the	  South	  Central 	  and	  Eastern	  European	  countries.	  SOEs	  
are 	  oNen	   not	   sold	  to	   the	  highest	   bidder,	   thus 	  implying	   that	   there 	  are	   incen=ves	   for	   the	  
acquirer	  to	  behave	  opportunis=cally.	  Because	  the	  government	  an=cipates 	  this 	  it	  has 	  its	  ways	  
to	   avoid	   it:	   it	   s=pulates 	   that	   acquirers 	   must	   not	   liquidate	   the 	   business,	   limits 	   layoﬀs,	  
s=pulates 	   a 	   maximum	   level 	   of	   post-­‐priva=za=on	   speciﬁc	   investments,	   etc.	   (Brouthers,	  
Bamossy,	  1997)	  However,	   it	  can	  also	  oﬀer	  the	  investors	  beKer	  condi=ons,	  such	  as:	   securing	  
ﬁnancing,	  guaranteeing	  procurement,	  allowing	  tax	  breaks,	  restric=ng	  import	  compe==on,	  or	  
limi=ng	  new	  entry.	  All 	  in	  all,	  government	  involvement	  and	  post-­‐priva=za=on	  condi=ons,	  such	  
as	  afore	  men=oned	  limi=ng	  of	  layoﬀs,	  is	  nega=vely	  correlated	  with	  performance.
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High	  country	   risk	  hinders 	  foreign	  direct	   investment	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  country	   risk	  includes	  
the	   following	   elements:	   limita=on	   on	   currency	   conver=bility,	   high	   inﬂa=on	   rates,	   GDP	  
decline5,	   poli=cal	   risk	   (e.g.	   government	   instability).	   When	   inves=ng	   in	   a 	   country	   with	   a	  
higher	  risk	  the	  returns	  are	  calculated	  with	  a	  higher	  return	  because	  the	  return	  also	  accounts	  
for	  the	  country	  risk	  premium.	  Consequently,	  the 	  post-­‐priva=za=on	  performance	  is 	  posi=vely	  
associated	  with	  the 	  degree	  of	  country	  risk.	  However	  this	  result	  does 	  not	  apply	  to	  a 	  long	  term	  
period.6	  
2. PrivaCzaCon’s	  Eﬀects	  on	  ProducCvity	  in	  Hungary,	  Romania	  and	  Ukraine
The	   empirical 	   work	   on	   the	   topic	   found	   evidence	   of	   a 	   substan=al 	   posi=ve 	   eﬀect	   of	  
priva=za=on	  on	  produc=vity.	   Romania 	  showed	  the	  best	   results 	  with	  a 	  range	  of	  es=mates	  
from	  15	  to	  50%;	  Hungary	  had	  a 	  range	  of	  8	  to	  28%;	  and	  for	  Ukraine	  the	  range	  varied	  from	  2	  
to	  16%,	  on	  annual	  basis.7	  (Brown,	  Earle,	  Telegdy,	  2005)
The	  diﬀerences 	  in	  the 	  ﬁrms’	  produc=vity	   across 	  the	  countries 	  appear	  primarily	  because	  the	  
methods	   and	   pace	   of	   priva=zing	   diﬀer	   from	   one 	   country	   to	   another.	   Hungary	   has 	   a	  
maintained	   a 	  constant	   and	   con=nuous	  process 	  and	   chose	   the	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   priva=za=on	  
method	   throughout	   the 	  transi=on	   period.	   Romania,	   in	   turn,	   knew	   a 	  slower	   pace	   in	   the	  
beginning	   when	   it	   tried	   the	   voucher	   programs.	   ANer	   1993,	   it	   proceeded	   towards 	  mass-­‐
priva=za=on	   and	   then	   engaged	   in	   programs	   with	   large-­‐scale 	   employee	   ownership	   and	  
dispersed	  shareholdings,	   focusing	   on	  foreign	  direct	   investment	   at	   the	  same	  =me.	  Ukraine	  
witnessed	  a 	  moderate 	  speed	  and	  there	  is	  proof	  of	   large	  manager	   and	  worker	   large-­‐scale	  
ownership.
There	  is 	  another	  important	  aspect	  to 	  be	  considered,	  namely	  foreign	  investment	  priva=za=on	  
as 	  opposed	   to	   priva=za=on	  involving	   domes=c	   ownership.	   It	   is 	  usually	   the 	  case	  that	   the	  
posi=ve	  eﬀects	  on	  produc=vity	  are 	  higher,	  when	  transferring	  ownership	  to	  foreigners 	  rather	  
than	  to	  domes=c	  investors,	  especially	   if	  the 	  owners	  believe	  that	  they	  can	  tap	  more	  beneﬁts	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5	  The	  Gross	  Domes&c	  Product	  in	  the	  SCEE	  countries	  oden	  decreased	  by	  20%	  p.a	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
transi&on	  period.	  (Uhlenbruck,	  De	  Castro,	  2000)
6	  Internet:	  www.emergingmarketsmonitor.com	  -­‐	  Homepage	  Emerging	  Markets	  Monitor,	  accessed:	  20.06.2010
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from	   beKer	   management	   skills	  or	   have 	  access 	  to	  ﬁnance 	  and	  new	   technologies.	   On	   the	  
other	  hand,	  foreigners 	  do	  not	  ﬁnd	  the	  incen=ves 	  to	  invest	  when	  layoﬀ	  decisions 	  are	  highly	  
poli=cized	  and	  when	  local	  networks	  and	  knowledge 	  of	  local	  condi=ons 	  are 	  nontransparent.	  
(Brown,	  Earle,	  Telegdy,	  2005)	  
In	  this 	  view,	  at	  studying	  the 	  posi=ve	  produc=vity	  eﬀects 	  of	  these	  countries	  when	  the 	  origin	  
of	   investment	   is 	   involved,	   we	   come	  across 	  no	   sta=s=cally	   relevant	   diﬀerences,	   not	   even	  
when	  scru=nized.	  Foreign	  investment	  assures 	  beKer	  produc=vity	  for	  everyone.	  The 	  posi=ve	  
eﬀect	  of	  foreign	  ownership	  are	  signiﬁcant	   in	  Romania,	  especially	   aNer	   1997,	  when	  greater	  
eﬀorts	  were	  made	  to	  aKract	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI).
Regarding	  the	  dynamics 	  of	   the 	  eﬀects,	   related	   to	  the	  priva=za=on’s 	  impact,	  Brown	  et	   	   al	  
observe	  an	   immediate	  eﬀect	   for	   Hungary	   and	  Romania.	   For	   Ukraine,	   the	  eﬀects 	  seem	  to	  
appear	  only	  aNer	  one	  year.	  Moreover,	   they	  con=nue	  to	  be	  posi=ve 	  and	  to	  have	  a	  sustained	  
increase 	  aNer	   three 	  years,	   in 	  the	  case	  of	  Romania 	  and	  Ukraine.	  The	  thin	  diﬀerences	  in	  the	  
dynamics	  of	  the 	  eﬀects 	  between	  the 	  three	  countries 	  are	  explained	  by	  two	  essen=al 	  drivers:	  
the	   management’s 	   aztude 	   aNer	   an=cipa=on	   of	   the 	   events,	   and	   the 	   supposi=on	   that	  
investors	  have	  private	  informa=on	  on	  the	  company’s	  growth	  poten=al.	  
Consequently,	  the	  managers	  in	  Hungary	  are	  more 	  career-­‐concerned	  and	  have	  the 	  necessary	  
incen=ves	  to	  show	  their	  skills 	  and	  perform	  well,	  while	  those	  from	  Ukraine 	  engage	  in	  asset-­‐
stripping8 	  because	  they	  would	  expect	  to	  be	  ﬁred	  aNer	  the	  priva=za=on.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
it	  is 	  implied	  that	  the 	  investors	  own	  private 	  informa=on	  which	  drives 	  them	  to	  buy	   and	  they	  
believe	  that	  the	  acquired	  ﬁrm	  would	  experience	  a	  posi=ve	  produc=vity	  shock	  comparable	  to	  
other	  ﬁrms	  in	  the	  same	  industry.	  (Brown,	  Earle,	  Telegdy,	  2005)
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8	  The	  individual	  sale	  of	  the	  company’s	  assets,	  such	  as	  its	  equipment	  and	  property,	  due	  poor	  management	  
condi&ons,	  because	  they	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  more	  valuable	  than	  the	  company	  as	  a	  whole.	  (www.investopedia.com	  -­‐	  
Financial	  Dic&onary,	  accessed:	  14.04.2010)
3. PrivaCzaCon’s	  Eﬀects	  on	  the	  Firm’s	  Revenue	  and	  Cost	  Performance
Eﬀec=ve 	  priva=za=on	  aﬀects 	  the 	  ﬁrm’s 	  revenue	  and	  cost	  performance 	  in	  a 	  posi=ve 	  way.	  In	  
the	  transi=on	  economies	  like	  Czech	  Republic,	  Hungary	  and	  Poland,	  the	  performance	  eﬀects	  
diﬀer	   depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  owner	   to	  whom	  control 	  is	  given.	   (Frydman,	   Gray,	   Hessel,	  
Rapaczynski,	  1999)
In	   the	   case	  where	   priva=za=on	   is 	   eﬀec=ve,	   the	   outsider	   versus 	   insider	   ownership	   aNer	  
restructuring	   receives 	  signiﬁcant	   importance 	   in	   observing	   the 	  diﬀerent	   eﬀects	   it	   has	   on	  
revenue	  performance 	  and	  cost	   reduc=on.	  This 	  dis=nc=on	  is 	  primarily	  given	  by	   the	  owners’	  
diﬀerent	   aztude	   towards 	   risk	   and	   uncertainty.	   Therefore,	   with	   insider	   ownership,	   the	  
manager	   or	   the 	  employees 	  are 	  in	   charge,	   and	  with	  outsider	   ownership	   foreign	   investors	  
have	  the	  control	  power.	  The	  results 	  of	  the	  study	   carried	  forward	  by	  Frydman	  et	  al 	  (1999),	  
using	  data 	  from	  these	  Central	  European	  countries,	   reports	  that	  priva=za=on	  is 	  eﬀec=ve	  in	  
enhancing	  revenue 	  and	  produc=vity	   performance	  when	   the 	  ﬁrms	  are	  outsider-­‐controlled,	  
but	  produces	  no	  signiﬁcant	  eﬀect	  for	  ﬁrms	  controlled	  by	  insiders.
Regarding	  the	  generaliza=on	  poten=al 	  of	  the	  results 	  on	  corporate	  performance,	  it	  has	  been	  
argued	  that	  they	  might	  be	  speciﬁc	  to	  the 	  Central 	  European	  environment	  due	  to	  the	  poli=cal,	  
macroeconomic	  and	  sectoral	  speciﬁcity	  of	  these	  post-­‐communist	  countries.
IV. PrivaCzaCon	  in	  the	  Energy	  Sector	  in	  SCEE
High	  energy	  consump=on	  bills 	  for	  gas 	  or	  electricity	  has	  created	  public	  awareness	  and	  awoke	  
the	  interest	  of	  the	  end	  consumer	  concerning	  energy	   eﬃciency.	  Many	   u=li=es 	  face	  ﬁnancial	  
diﬃcul=es 	  because	  they	   have 	  weak	  corporate	  governance	  and	  internal 	  ineﬃciencies.	  Most	  
of	   these	  u=li=es 	  are	  usually	   s=ll 	  state 	  owned	  enterprises 	  (SOEs),	   especially	   in	   the 	  South	  
Eastern	  Europe.	  Shleifer	  and	  Vishny	   (1997)	  call	  these 	  companies	  a	  “manifesta=on	  of	  radical	  
failure	  of	  corporate	  governance”.	  
How	  has 	  the	  world	  changed	  in	  the	  last	  decades 	  respec=ve	  to	  the	  economists’	  beliefs	  upon	  
state	  ownership	  of	  certain	  industries?	  It	  was	  80	  years	  ago	  when	  Henry	  Simons	  said:
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“The	  state	  should	  face	  the	  necessity	  of	  actually	  taking	  over,	  owing	  and	  managing	  directly,	  
both	  the	  railroads	  and	  the	  u:li:es,	  and	  all	  other	  industries	  in	  which	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  maintain	  
eﬀec:vely	  compe::ve	  condi:ons“.	  (Simons,	  1934,	  p.	  50-­‐51)
The	  South	  Eastern	  European	  countries 	  have	  a 	  Communist	  heritage	  in	  common,	  which	  can	  
explain	  why	   these	  countries 	  have	  the	  same 	  issues 	  regarding	  the	  proﬁtability	  of	  their	  actual	  
former	   state	  owned	  u=li=es.	   The	  ineﬃciency	   of	   the	   former	   state	  enterprises 	  is 	  the	  most	  
important	  social 	  cost.	  Foreign	  investors,	  especially	  Western	  European,	  have	  already	  spoKed	  
the	  great	   poten=al	  of	   the	  sector	  and	  area,	   and	  naturally	   this 	  is 	  why	   there	   is 	  currently	   an	  
intense	  investment	  ac=vity	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  of	  these	  emerging	  markets.	  
Most	   oNen,	   Foreign	  Direct	   Investment	   addresses 	  the 	  form	   of	  priva=za=on	   in	   the	  case	  of	  
state	  owned	  u=li=es.	  As 	  priva=za=on	  has 	  now	  become	  a 	  governmental 	  encouraged	  measure	  
to	  achieve	  sustainable	  development	  in	  the	  long	  run,	   the 	  investors	  buy	  these	  companies 	  at	  
more	  than	  advantageous 	  prices.	  The	  goal 	  would	  be	  to	  transform	  the	  ineﬃcient	  former	  state	  
owned	  u=li=es	  into	  modernized	  and	  highly	   eﬃcient	  companies	  with	  a	  beKer	   infrastructure	  
at	   almost	   any	   costs.	   The 	   gains 	   come	   from	   the	   achieved	   eﬃciency	   along	   the	   resource-­‐
produc=on-­‐transport-­‐distribu=on-­‐consump=on	  chain	   that	   brings	  along	  a 	  beKer	  use	  of	  the	  
resources,	   the	   infrastructure’s 	   development,	   more	   aﬀordable	   bills 	   for	   consumers,	   and	  
sustainable	  development	  within	  the	  environmental 	  norms.	  (Czamanski,	  1999,	  p.	  1-­‐25)	  In	  this	  
sense,	  Romania 	  would	  be	  an	  eloquent	  example	  of	   the	  governmental 	  friendliness 	  towards	  
priva=za=on	  with	  foreign	  ownership.
Moreover,	   once	  an	  ac=vity	   is 	  priva=zed,	   the	  role	  of	  government	   in	  control 	  and	  regula=on	  
generally	   falls 	  to	   some	  extent,	   and	  consequently	   so	  do	   the	  opportuni=es	  for	   corrup=on,	  
which	  previously	  was 	  the	  source	  of	  so	  many	   ineﬃciencies	  in	  the	  SCEE	  area.	  However,	  there	  
is 	   evidence	   that	   the	   East	   European	   countries 	   and	   even	   Russia	   succeeded	   in	   designing	  
rela=vely	   corrup=on-­‐free	   priva=za=on	   programs	   despite	   widespread	   corrup=on	   in	   their	  
bureaucracies.	  (Bycko,	  Shleifer,	  Vishny,	  1995)
The	  regula=on	  responsibility	  is 	  partly	  delegated	  to	  a	  higher	  level,	  e.g.	  the	  EU	  level,	  and	  lately,	  
has 	  become	  a 	  central 	  global	   interest.	   Public	   U=lity	   Regulatory	   Policies 	  began	   to	   play	   an	  
increasingly	  important	  role	  having	  the 	  mission	  to	  promote	  sustainable	  development	  at	  both	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a	  global 	  and	  regional 	  level.	  For	  instance,	  the	  European	  Union	  has 	  launched	  in	  2007	  the	  new	  
energy	   policy,	   and	   energy	   occupies	   an	   essen=al 	   role 	   in	   the	   Union’s 	   development.	   The	  
explana=on	  for	   this 	  central	  role 	  lies 	  in	  the	  sector’s 	  impact	  on	  climate	  change,	  among	  other	  
factors.
Usually	   the	  government	   is 	  reluctant	   to	  priva=ze,	   especially	   when	   it	   comes	  to	  strategically	  
important	  sectors	  like 	  the	  energy	  industry.	  Studies 	  carried	  from	  OECD9	  countries 	  show	  that,	  
aNer	   a 	  priva=za=on,	   77.1%	  of	   the	  priva=zed	  u=li=es 	  have 	  the 	  government	   as 	  the 	  largest	  
shareholder.	  Moreover,	   this 	  reluctance	  can	  manifest	   itself	   irrespec=ve	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  
investors.	  Take 	  for	   instance	  the	  example	  of	  Mexico	  and	  Venezuela 	  where 	  the	  cons=tu=on	  
explicitly	   prohibits 	   the 	   priva=za=on	   of	   their	   na=onal 	   monopolies	   even	   to	   domes=c	  
capitalists.	  However,	  this 	  reluctance 	  towards 	  priva=za=on	  does 	  not	  apply	   to	  the	  Communist	  
and	  formerly	   Communist	   countries	  in	  SCEE,	   thus 	  again	  proving	  the	  speciﬁcity	   of	   the	  area.	  
(Bortoloz,	  Faccio,	  2004)
In	  the 	  transi=on	  countries 	  of	  Eastern	  and	  Central	  Europe,	  the	  decentraliza=on	  process 	  has	  
begun	  with	  ci=es 	  establishing	  semi-­‐private 	  ventures 	  on	  a	  concessionary	   basis 	  as 	  a 	  part	  of	  
poli=cal 	  reforms,	   so	   that	   the	   tasks 	  of	   former	   regional 	  state	   agencies 	  are	   being	   given	   to	  
municipali=es.	   This	   is 	   the 	   case	   of	   some	   big	   ci=es	   in 	   the	   Czech	   Republic	   and	   Hungary.	  
However,	  this 	  did	  not	  provide 	  the	  long	  sought	  eﬃciency.	  The	  reason	  why	   the	  strategy	   failed	  
was	  because	  of	  the 	  lack	  of	  ﬁnancial 	  and	  infrastructural 	  capacity	  at	  the 	  municipal 	  level.	  This	  
fact	  might	  well 	  prove 	  an	  incen=ve 	  to	  priva=ze.	  Of	  all	  the	  transi=onal 	  economies	  Hungary,	  the	  
Czech	  Republic,	  and	  Poland	  were	  the	  most	  successful 	  with	  these	  decentraliza=on	  aKempts.	  
Hungary	  followed	  the 	  priva=za=on	  path	  with	  a	  fast	  pace,	  in	  the	  Czech	  Republic	  independent	  
power	  producers	  are	  very	  ac=ve	  in	  the 	  domes=c	  market	  and	  in	  Poland	  a	  new	  energy	  law	  was	  
enacted	  in	  1997.	  (Interna=onal	  Labor	  Oﬃce,	  1999)
The	  trend	  in	  the	  gas 	  sector	   is 	  the	  con=nuous 	  seeking	  of	  ways 	  to	  extend	  the	  network	  across	  
the	  con=nent	  via 	  joint	  ventures.	  The	  sector	  is 	  par=ally	  priva=zed	  by	  the	  Russian	  gas 	  company	  
Gazprom,	   which	  produces 	  almost	   one-­‐third	  of	   the	  world's	  natural 	  gas.	   Ruhrgas,	   which	   is	  
Germany's 	  largest	   gas	  distribu=on	  company,	   announced	  that	   it	   will 	  establish	  a	  long-­‐term	  
“strategic	   alliance”	  with	  Gazprom,	  and	  signed	  contracts 	  for	   the	  supply	   of	  up	  to	  13	  billion	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cubic	   meters	  of	  Russian	  natural 	  gas.	   (Interna=onal 	  Gas 	  Report,	   1998)	  This 	  would	  possibly	  
lead	   to	   the	   construc=on	   of	   new	   pipelines.	   Gazprom	   is 	  also	   expected	   to	   establish	  other	  
strategic	  alliances 	  with	  Royal 	  Dutch	  Shell 	  and	  ENI 	  of	  Italy.	  However,	  the 	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  
countries 	  have	  shown	  some	  poli=cal	  resistance	  regarding	  the	  Russian	  gas 	  company,	  and	  they	  




V. Background	  InformaCon:	  Merger	  at	  Horizon
The	   energy	   sector	   dominates 	  M&A	   worldwide	  with	   over	   two	   thirds	   of	   the	   transac=ons	  
located	   in	  Russia.	   In	  Romania 	  as 	  in	   all 	  emerging	  markets,	   M&A	   is 	   largely	   a 	  priva=za=on	  
driven	  sector.	  The 	  transi=on	  from	  centrally	  planned	  to	  market	  economies 	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  
has 	  become	  a 	  ﬁeld	  of	  debate	  in	  economic	  literature 	  since 	  the	  late	  1980s.	   Intensive	  mergers	  
&	   acquisi=ons	   (M&A)	   ac=vity	   and	   priva=za=on	   of	   state 	   owned	   companies,	   have	   been	  
characteris=c	  of	  the	  energy	  industry	  for	  more	  than	  20	  years.	  
It	   is 	  assumed	   that	   over	   the 	   next	   three	   decades,	   Eastern	   Europe	   will 	   approach	   current	  
Western	   living	   standards 	   thus 	   leading	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   the 	   energy	   consump=on.	   Such	  
op=mis=c	   predic=on,	   however,	   should	  not	   be	  taken	  at	   face	  value.	  Financial 	  and	   technical	  
constraints 	  will	  impede	  some	  of	  the 	  poten=al	  gains	  in	  energy	  eﬃciency	   in	  Eastern	  Europe.	  
Overcoming	   them	  will 	  require	  na=onal	   leadership	   and	   decisive	   interna=onal 	  coopera=on.	  
For	   capturing	   the 	  energy-­‐eﬃciency	   poten=al 	   in	   Romania	   a	   certain	   reform	   in	   the	   energy	  
market	  was	  implied.	  (Chandler,	  W.,	  Kolar,	  S.,	  Gheorghe,	  A.,and	  Sitnicki,	  S.)	  
Since 	  2000,	   the	  Romanian	  government	  has 	  accelerated	  eﬀorts 	  to	  restructure	  and	  priva=ze	  
the	  ineﬃcient	  systems	  of	  energy	  produc=on	  and	  distribu=on	  inherited	  from	  the	  Ceauşescu	  
regime.	   2004	   was 	   the	   year	   when	   the 	   Romanian	   energy	   sector,	   seen	   by	   many	   as 	   the	  
backbone 	  of	  Romania’s 	  economy,	   took	  a 	  decisive	  step	  towards 	  integra=on	  in	  the	  European	  
single	  market.	   Four	   European	  investors 	  took	  over	   the	  reins	  of	  key	   companies	  forming	  the	  
backbone 	  of	   the	   Romanian	   energy	   sector,	   in	   transac=ons	   totaling	   a 	  rough	   €2.25	   billion.	  
Among	  these	  companies 	  there 	  was	  E.ON	  AG,	  who	  won	  the	  auc=on	  to	  merge	  with	  Electrica	  
Moldova	  SA,	  a 	  state 	  owned	  company.	  The 	  =me	  line	  to	  this 	  merger	  expands 	  over	  a 	  period	  of	  
6	  years,	  from	  2004	  -­‐	  2009.
The	   reform	   started	   following	   a 	  Government	   Decision	   in	   January	   2002	   with	   the	  market	  
liberaliza=on.	  Then,	  the	  market	  openness 	  was 	  increased	  to	  33%,	  with	  licensed	  suppliers 	  and	  
eligible	   customers 	  deﬁned	   by	   the	   regulatory	   authority.	   In 	  prac=ce,	   the 	  contracts	   signed	  
between	   licensed	   suppliers 	  and	   eligible	   customers 	  amount	   to	  around	  8%	  of	   the 	  market.	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Moreover,	   from	  January	  1,	  2007,	  as 	  Romania 	  became	  part	  of	  the	  EU,	   the	  domes=c	   natural	  
gas	  market	  was	  liberalized	  for	  all 	  non-­‐household	  consumers,	  and	  from	  July	   1,	  2007,	   for	  all	  
consumers.	  10
VI. Merger	  and	  PrivaCzaCon	  Environment
1. Companies’	  Proﬁles
1.1. The	  Acquirer:	  E.ON	  Group
Figure	  1:	  E.ON	  Group	  Logo
E.ON	  AG	  is 	  an	  industrial 	  group	  in	  Germany	  ac=ve	  in	  the 	  energy	  business.	  Moreover,	  it	  is 	  the	  
second	   largest	   listed	  power	   genera=on	  company	   in	  Europe 	  according	  to	  Business 	  Insights	  
report	  of	  June	  2009.	  It	  has	  a	  market	  share	  of	  6.7%,	  based	  on	  the 	  sales 	  in	  2007	  according	  to	  
the	  same	  energy	  market	  valua=on	  report.	  
The	  company	   is	  very	   interna=onalized	  with	  company’s 	  opera=ons 	  ver=cally	   integrated	  and	  
split	   into	   separate 	  market	   units	   all 	   over	   the	   world.	   It	   possesses	   long	   term	   gas 	   supply	  
contracts	   and	   it	   began	  with	   expanding	   on	   the	   electricity	   as 	  well.	   The	   units 	  of	   business	  
opera=on	  are:	  Central 	  Europe,	  providing	  energy	   for	  the 	  Netherlands,	  Slovakia,	  Hungary,	  the	  
Czech	  Republic,	  and	  Switzerland;	   Pan-­‐European	  Gas;	  UK;	  Nordic,	  distributes 	  energy	   for	  the	  
northern	  Europe;	  U.S.	  Midwest;	  Energy	  Trading;	  Climate	  and	  Renewables;	   Russia;	  and	  Italy.	  
The	  company	  is	  based	  in	  Dusseldorf.
In	  the	  future,	  E.ON	  plans	  to	  invest	  €30	  billion	  to	  strengthen	  its 	  infrastructure 	  and	  customer	  
base.	  The 	  investments 	  should	  take	  place	  during	  2009	  -­‐	  2011.	  However,	  in	  2008	  and	  2009,	  the	  
company’s 	  investment	  appe=te 	  was 	  cut	  to	  certain	  extent,	  when	  the 	  group	  had	  to	  pay	  a	  ﬁne	  
of	  €38	  million,	  and	  €553	  million	  respec=vely.	   In	  2008	   it	  was 	  for	   the	  breach	  of	  a	  European	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10	  Internet:	  hUp://www.enercee.net/romania/energy-­‐market-­‐actors.html	  -­‐	  Austrian	  Energy	  Agency,	  accessed:	  
5.03.2010
Commission	  seal 	  in	  E.ON’s 	  premises	  during	  an	  inspec=on11 	  and	  in	  2009	  for	  market	  sharing	  
behavior	  together	  with	  GDF	  Suez	  SA	  (of	  France)	  in	  breach	  of	  EC	   Treaty	   rules	  on	  cartels	  and	  
restric=ve	  business	  prac=ces	  (Ar=cle	  81).
The	  company	   that	   acquired	  the	  state-­‐owned	  u=lity	   Electrica	  Moldova 	  S.A	   is 	  E.ON	  ENERGIE	  
AG,	   a 	  subsidiary	   of	  the	  German	  company	   E.ON	  AG	  (100%),	   the	  mother	   company	   of	  E.ON	  
Holding.	  The 	  company	  E.ON	  ENERGIE	  AG	  represents	  the	  E.ON	  Holding	  for	  Central 	  Europe	  for	  
businesses	  in	  energy	  ﬁeld.	  
1.1.1.Major	  AcquisiCons
According	   to	   the	  energy	   market	   research	   report,	   issued	   June 	  2009,	   and	  available 	  on	  the	  
Business	  Insights	  database,	  between	  2007	  -­‐	  2009,	  E.ON	  closed	  the	  following	  major	  deals 12:
Year Target	  Company RaConale
Jul-­‐08 Wind	  farm	  (Shell),	  the	  UK
Strengthened	  renewable	  energy	  
porkolio
Jun-­‐08 Endesa	  Europa,	  Spain
Expanding	  genera&on	  capacity	  in	  
France,	  Poland,	  Spain	  and	  Italy
Jun-­‐08 EnelViesgo,	  Spain Expanding	  power	  genera&on	  in	  Spain
Oct-­‐07 OGK-­‐4,	  Russia
Market	  entry	  decision	  into	  Russian	  
electricity	  market
Aug-­‐07 Energi	  E2	  Renovables,	  Ibericas,	  Spain
Strengthened	  renewable	  energy	  
porkolio	  in	  Spain	  and	  Portugal
Table	  1:	  E.ON	  major	  M&A	  Ac:vity	  (2007	  -­‐	  2009)
	  Source:	  E.ON	  Archive,	  Internal	  Data
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11	  Council	  Regula&on	  1/2003	  (Ar&cle	  23(1)	  (e))	  provides	  that	   the	  Commission	  can	  impose	  a	  ﬁne	  of	  up	  to	  1%	  of	  
the	  company's	  total	  turnover	  for	  a	  seal	  broken	  inten&onally	  or	  negligently.
12	  Internet:	  www.bi-­‐interac&ve.com	  -­‐	  Business	  Insights	  Database	  /	  Energy,	  accessed:	  23.03.2010
1.1.2.Historical	  Financial	  InformaCon
E.ON	  generated	  €86,753m	  consolidated	  revenues	  in	  the	  ﬁscal 	  year	  200813,	  registering	  35.5%	  
growth	  over	  2007.	  Revenues,	  though,	  decreased	  by	   32.7%	  and	  reached	  €30,813m	  in	  2008.	  
The	  ﬁgures 	  relate	   to	   its 	  u=li=es 	  business	  in	  Europe.	   The 	  decrease	  in	   revenues 	  is 	  strongly	  
connected	  with	  the	  forma=on	  of	  a 	  separate	  repor=ng	  division	  designed	  for	   energy	   trading.	  
This 	   lead	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of	   trading	   revenues	   from	   segmental 	  revenues	  which	  was 	  not	  
possible 	  during	  2004–07.	  E.ON	  recorded	  opera=ng	  proﬁt	  of	  €8,838m	  in	  2008,	  7.6%	  growth	  
over	   2007.	   During	  2004–08,	   E.ON’s 	  opera=ng	  proﬁts 	  from	   its 	  u=li=es	  business 	  in	   Europe	  
increased	  at	  a	  CAGR14	  of	  13.4%	  during	  2004–0815.
€	  m 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 CAGR	  
2004-­‐2008
Turnover 45,024 54,096 43,272 49,174 30,813 (9.0%)
Opera&ng	  
Proﬁt
6,326 6,796 7,930 8,820 8,838 8.7%
Recent	  ﬁscal	  year	  end	  is	  December	  2008.
Segmental	  revenues	  for	  2004	  and	  2005	  include	  up/midstream	  gas	  revenues	  whereas	  for	  2006-­‐2008,	  up/
midstream	  were	  reported	  separately	  and	  are	  excluded.
Segmental	  revenues	  during	  2004-­‐2007	  include	  trading	  revenues,	  as	  their	  backup	  is	  not	  available	  in	  the	  
company	  annual	  report.
Opera&ng	  proﬁt	  also	  includes	  proﬁt	  from	  up/midstream	  gas	  sales.
Table	  2:	  E.ON	  European	  u:li:es’	  ﬁnancial	  performance	  (2004-­‐2008)
Source:	  E.ON	  Archive,	  Internal	  Data
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13	  Company	  insider	  informa&on	  made	  public	  without	  any	  breach	  of	  conﬁden&ality	  contract	  
14	  CAGR	  stands	  for	  Compound	  Annual	  Growth	  Rate	  which	  is	  calculated	  as:	  	  
Internet:	  www.investopedia.com	  -­‐	  Financial	  Dic&onary,	  accessed:	  6.05.2010
15	  Business	  Insights	  Report:	  Top	  10	  European	  U&lity	  Companies	  (Internet:	  www.bi-­‐interac&ve.com	  -­‐	  Business	  
Insights	  Database	  /	  Energy,	  accessed:	  23.03.2010)
1.1.3.History	  and	  Nature	  of	  Business	  of	  the	  Acquirer	  
The	   Na=onal 	   Company	   named	   Societatea 	   Na=onala 	   de 	   Gaze	   Naturale 	   Romgaz,	   was	  
reorganized	  according	  to	  the	  services	  provided.	   ANer	   the	  reorganiza=on	  resulted	  DistriGaz	  
Nord,	  a 	  state-­‐owned	  company	  that	  would	  become	  priva=zed	  in	  June 	  2005	  by	  E.ON	  Ruhrgas.	  
Un=l 	  April 	  2006	  the	  company	  con=nued	  to	  run	  under	  the	  same 	  name	  when	  it	  became	  E.ON	  
Gaz	   Romaina.	   Another	   important	   point	   in	   the 	  company’s 	  history	   had	  been	   July	   1,	   2007,	  
when	  the	  management	   had	   to	   split	   the	  ac=vity	   into	  supply	   and	   distribu=on	  and	  thus	  to	  
organize	  two	  legally	  independent	  en==es:	  E.ON	  Gaz	  Romania	  (supply	  ac=vity)	  and	  E.ON	  	  Gaz	  
Distribu=e	  (distribu=on	  ac=vity).	  The	  decision	  came	  as 	  a 	  consequence	  of	  the	  alignment	  of	  
the	   Romanian	   legal 	   requirements 	   to	   EU	   and	   had	   the	  main	   purpose	   of	   ensuring	   a 	   full	  
liberaliza=on	  and	   fair	   compe==on	  on	   the 	  market.	   Both	   companies	  are 	  held	   by	   E.ON	   Gaz	  
Romania	  Holding	  S.R.L	  since	  January	  14,	  2008.	  	  
At	  founda=on	  the	  share	  capital	  of	  the	  company,	  E.ON	  Gaz	  Romania 	  Holding	  S.R.L	  was 	  RON	  
10,000	  and	  the 	  only	  shareholder	  was	  E.ON	  Ruhrgas	  Interna=onal	  AG.	  The	  capital 	  structure	  of	  
the	  company	   changes 	  on	  March	  17,	   2008,	  with	  E.ON	  Ruhrgas 	  holding	  90.2%	  of	  the 	  shares	  
and	  European	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruc=on	  and	  Development	  (EBRD)	  owning	  9.8%.	  There 	  is 	  also	  
a	  capital	  increase	  to	  RON	  1,116,800,660.
1.1.4. SWOT	  Analysis
According	  to	  the	  same	  energy	  market	   research	  report,	  issued	  June	  2009,	   and	  available	  on	  
the	  Business 	  Insights 	  database	  E.ON’s	  growth	  strategies	  are:	  to	  develop	  genera=on	  porjolio	  
and	  modernize	  distribu=on	  network	  in	  core	  markets,	  to	  expand	  into	  new	  markets,	  to	  focus	  
on	  renewable	  energy,	  and	  to	  further	  develop	  its	  acquisi=ons	  strategy.	  
The	   following	   ﬁgure	   highlights 	   the 	   best	   the 	   company’s 	   strengths,	   weaknesses 	   (internal	  
factors)	  and	  opportuni=es	  and	  threats	  (external	  factors):	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Figure	  2:	  E.ON’s	  SWOT	  Analysis
Source:	  Energy	  Report,	  June	  2009
1.2. The	  Target:	  Electrica	  Moldova	  SA
Figure	  3:	  ELECTRICA	  MOLDOVA’	  s	  Company	  Logo
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1.3. History	  and	  Nature	  of	  Business	  of	  the	  Target
Electrica 	  Moldova 	   is 	  one	   of	   the	   eight	   electricity	   transport	   and	   transmission	   subsidiaries	  
owned	  by	   ELECTRICA	  SA.	   It	  operates 	  in	  the 	  Northern	  and	  Eastern	  part	  of	  Romania 	  and	  has	  
the	  headquarters 	  in	  Bacau.	  Electriva 	  Moldova	  provides	  electricity	   for	   6	  coun=es 16	   -­‐	  Bacau,	  
Botosani,	   Iasi,	   Neamt,	   Suceava	   and	   Vaslui.	   In 	   2004	   the	   company	   registered	   1,335,305	  
consumers	  to	  whom	   it	   distributed	   4,186,878	   MWh	  of	   electricity.	   This 	  represents 	  12%	  of	  
ELECTRICA	   SA’s 	   sales 	   and	   out	   of	   the	   total 	   consumer’s 	   number	   25%	   are	   households.	  
Addi=onally,	   the	   company	   has	   a	   total 	   distribu=on	   network	   of	   36,850	   km2	   and	   it	   is	  
interconnected	   with	   the	   na=onal 	   network	   of	   high	   voltage 	   transport	   and	   with	   other	  













km km km nr MVA nr MVA
ELECTRICA
MOLDOVA
2.688 16.992 30.745 134 4.181 10.080 2.888
Table	  3:	  Electrica	  Moldova’s	  Distribu:on	  Network
Source:	  E.ON	  Archive,	  Internal	  Data
The	   ac=vi=es	   are 	   coming	   oﬀ	   based	   on	   Supplying	   Licence	   No.	   452/29.04.2002	   and	  
Distribu=on	  Licence 	  No.	  451/29.04.2002	  that	  were 	  conferred	  by	   the	  Na=onal 	  Authority	   for	  
Energy	  Regula=on	  (ANRE).
2. Economic	  CondiCons
Romania 	  is 	  an	  upper-­‐middle-­‐income 	  EU	  member	   economy	  which	  is 	  located	  in	  the	  Central	  
Eastern	  Europe	  (CEE).	   	   It	  is 	  the	  11th	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  EU	  by	  total 	  nominal 	  GDP	  and	  it	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16 	  From	   an	  oﬃcial	   administra&ve	   point	  of	  view,	  Romania	  is	  organized	   in	   41	  coun&es	  and	   the	  municipality	  of	  
Bucharest.	  Each	  county	  serves	  as	  the	  local	   level	  of	  government	  within	   its	  borders	  and	  they	  also	  represent	   the	  
NUTS-­‐3	   sta&s&cal	   subdivisions	  of	   the	   European	  Union.	   (Internet:	  www.wikipedia.com	   -­‐	   Romania’s	   Coun&es,	  
accessed:	  1.07.2010)
occupies 	  the	  8th	  place	  based	  on	  purchasing	  power	  parity.	  As 	  surface,	   it	   is 	  the 	  7th	  largest	  
country	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  with	  the	  largest	  ﬁnancial 	  center	  being	  the	  capital,	  Bucharest.	  
Since 	  1989,	  there	  has	  been	  a 	  steady	  growth	  rate	  in	  foreign	  direct	   investment,	  totaling	  more	  
than	  €45	  billion.
A	   complete 	  valua=on	   of	   a 	  business 	  and	   of	   business 	  ac=vi=es 	  implies 	  the 	  considering	   of	  
current	   and	   prospec=ve	  economic	   condi=ons,	   both	   in	   the	   na=onal	   economy	   and	   of	   the	  
industry	   or	   industries 	  of	   interest.	   The	  most	   important	   variables	  taken	  into	  account	   in	  this	  
respect	  are:	  GDP	  (real 	  gross 	  domes=c	  product),	  the 	  unemployment	  rate,	  interest	  rates,	  and	  
inﬂa=on	  rates.	  The 	  period	  of	  our	  interest	  is	  the	  year	  of	  the	  merger	  and	  the 	  years 	  following	  it	  
to	  ﬁnally	  be	  able	  to	  es=mate	  the	  success	  of	  the	  merger.	  
Romanian Key Economic Indicators and Forecast
2008 - 2011(F)
2008 2009 2010(F) 2011(F)
GDP, real (%) 7.1% (7.1%) 0.4% 3.5%
Unemployment Rate (% of Laborforce) 4% 6.3% 8.5% 7%
Private Consumption 8.4% (9.2%) 0.7% 4.6%
Consumer Prices 7.9% 5.6% 4% 3.9%
Export Volume Growth (% p.a.) 19.4% (5.5%) 4.8% 7%
Policy Interest Rate (% p.a.) 10.25% 8% 6.25% 5.75%
Gross Foreign Debt (% GDP) 37.6% 55.4% 57.2% 56%
Table	  4:	  Romanian	  Key	  Economic	  Indicators	  and	  Forecast
Source:	  Central	  Bank,	  Central	  Sta&s&cal	  Oﬃce,	  UniCredit	  Tiriac	  Bank	  Macroeconomic	  Research,	  Uni	  
Credit	  Group,	  CEE	  Research	  -­‐	  CEE	  Biweekly	  and	  DB	  Research	  
The	  actual 	  ﬁnancial 	  crisis 	  (2007	  -­‐	  present),	  considered	  by	  many	   economists	  to	  be	  the	  worst	  
since	  the 	  Great	   Depression	  of	  the	  1930s,	   leN	   Romania	  signiﬁcantly	   exposed	   to	  the	  global	  
downturn.	   Its 	  weakness 	  was 	   increased	   by	   the	   con=nuous	   foreign	   borrowing	   needed	   to	  
sustain	  its 	  moderniza=on	  needs.	  The	  year	  2009	  was	  the	  year	  when	  the 	  vulnerable	  Romanian	  
economy	  felt	  the	  shock	  of	  the	  ﬁnancial	  crisis.
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The	   event	   studied,	   the	   merger	   between	   E.ON	   Gaz	   Romania 	   and	   Electrica 	   Moldova,	  
happened	  over	  a	  period	  of	  4	  years 	  before 	  it	  was 	  ﬁnally	  completed	  by	  2008.	  At	  the	  =me,	  the	  
external 	   environment	   was	   characterized	   by	   a 	   private 	   consump=on	   level 	   dropping	   from	  
14.6%,	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  2008,	  to	  3.7%;	  an	  investment	  level 	  steeply	  declining	  from	  27.7%	  
to	  2.8%;	  and	  a 	  Na=onal 	  Bank	  struggling	  with	  any	  array	  of	  instruments 	  to	  stop	  the 	  inﬂa=onary	  
pressures.	   The	  gas 	  and	   electricity	   prices 	  were	  on	  an	  ascendent	   slope	  with	  the	  gas 	  prices	  
going	  up	  by	  12.5%	  and	  the	  electricity	   prices 	  increasing	  by	   5.3%.	  Moreover,	  gas 	  distribu=on	  
companies 	   have	   already	   announced	   their	   inten=ons	   to	   apply	   to	   the	   energy	   regulator	  
“Autoritatea 	   Na=onala	   de 	   Reglementare	   in	   domeniul 	   Energiei”	   (ANRE)	   for	   addi=onal	  
increases	  in	  natural	  gas	  prices	  later	  on	  that	  year.
The	  year	  2009	  was 	  the 	  year	  when	  crisis	  hit	  the	  Romanian	  economy.	  A	  nega=ve 	  GDP	  of	  -­‐7.1%	  
was	  registered	  together	  with	  a 	  fall 	  of	  the 	  private	  consump=on	  by	   -­‐9.2%	  and	  a	  huge	  loss 	  in	  
investment	   of	   -­‐25.3%.	  Only	   a 	  very	   slow	  recovery	   of	   0.4%	  was 	  registered	  during	  2010	   and	  
consump=on	  level	  is	  aﬀected	  in	  both	  private	  and	  public	   sectors.	  Analysts 	  foresaw	  from	  the	  
beginning	  that	  the	  only	  solu=on	  Romania	  had	  to	  recover	  from	  ﬁnancial 	  distress	  was 	  to	  take	  
Poland’s 	  example	  and	  start	   implemen=ng	  government	  infrastructure	  projects 	  and	  other	  EU	  
funds 	  projects.	  Addi=onally,	  major	  steps	  towards 	  adop=ng	  structural 	  reforms	  for	   reshaping	  
the	  public	  sector	  need	  to	  be	  made.	  
Some	   of	   the	   pressure	   induced	   by	   the	   signiﬁcant	   budget	   deﬁcit	   risk	   was 	   oﬀset	   by	   the	  
Interna=onal	  Monetary	   Fund	  (IMF)	  assistance	  17 	   for	  current	  spending	  reduc=on	  and	  public	  
sector	   restructuring.	  The	  IMF-­‐EU	  agreement	  has	  assured	  both	  the	  stability	   to	  Romania,	   as	  
the	  credit	  ra=ng	  went	  from	  nega=ve	  to	  stable,18	  and	  the	  needed	  external 	  ﬁnancing.	  ANer	  the	  
Execu=ve	  Board	  discussion	  regarding	  the 	  stand-­‐by-­‐agreement	  on	  Romania,	  Mr.	   John	  Lipsky,	  
First	  Deputy	  Managing	  Director	  and	  Ac=ng	  Chairman,	   said	  that	   the 	  joint	   funding	  will 	  “(...)	  
help	   (Romania	   a.n.)	   cushion	   the	   economic	   downturn	   and	   will 	   provide	   reassurance	   to	  
markets 	  that	   Romania’s	   external	   obliga=ons 	  will 	  be 	  met.	   It	   sends 	  a 	  strong	   signal 	  of	   the	  
interna=onal 	   community’s 	   conﬁdence 	   that,	   with	   the 	   consistent	   implementa=on	   of	   the	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17	  May	  4,	  2009,	  IMF	  Execu&ve	  Board	  approves	  €12.9	  Billion	  Stand-­‐by-­‐arrangement	  for	  Romania
February	  19,	  2010,	  IMF	  completes	  Second	  and	  Third	  Review	  under	  Stand-­‐by-­‐arrangement	  with	  Romania	  and	  
approves	  $3.32	  Billion	  disbursement
18	  Fitch	  and	  S&P’s	  long	  term	  foreign	  currency	  credit	  ra&ng	  from	  February	  and	  March	  2010	  
program,	  Romania	  will 	  weather	   the	  current	  diﬃcul=es 	  and	  emerge	  with	  a 	  beKer-­‐balanced	  
and	  more	  ﬂexible	  economy,”	  Mr.	  Lipsky	  said.19
The	  Na=onal	  Bank	  of	  Romania	  announced	  a 	  series 	  of	  increases 	  in	  the	  interest	  rates.	  	  The	  rate	  
started	  increasing	  gradually	   from	  7.5%	  in	  January	   2008	  un=l 	  peaking	   the 	  10.25%	  value,	   in	  
January	   2009,	   and	  then	  began	  decreasing	  slowly	   un=l 	  hizng	   the	  actual	  value	  of	  7%	  as	  of	  
April 	  2010.	   The 	  raising	   of	   the 	  key	   policy	   un=l 	  10.25%	   signals	  the	  fact	   that	   the	  Romanian	  
Central	  Bank	   is 	  ready	   to	  use	  the 	  en=re	  array	   of	   instruments 20	   to	  counter	   the	  inﬂa=onary	  
pressures	  that	  appeared	  as	  a	  follow-­‐up	  of	  the	  strong	  growth	  in	  consump=on.	  
Source:	  The	  Na&onal	  Bank	  of	  Romania	  (Internet:	  www.bnro.ro,	  accessed:	  7.05.2010)
	  
3. Industry	  CondiCons
Romania 	  is 	  modest	  in	  its 	  own	  oil 	  and	  gas	  reserves	  and	  there 	  is	  con=nuous 	  explora=on	  in	  the	  
Black	   Sea	  despite	  disputes	  with	   Ukraine.	   The	   country	   has 	  also	   valuable	   coal	   reserves,	   a	  
network	  of	  hydro	  power	   plants,	  and	  two	  nuclear	   power	   plants	  at	  Cernavoda.	  According	  to	  
the	  U.S	  Law	  Library	  of	  Congress’	  country	  report,	  issued	  December	  2006,	  Romania 	  is 	  the	  only	  
Central	  European	  country	  with	  enough	  reserves 	  of	  primary	  energy	  to	  have	  the 	  poten=al	  to	  
be	   energy	   self-­‐suﬃcient	   for	   several	   decades.	   Moreover,	   the	   sector	   is 	   the	   third	   largest	  







Figure	  4:	  The	  NBR	  Reference	  Rate	  Evolu&on	  (%)
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19	  Internet:	  www.imf.org	  -­‐	  Interna&onal	  Monetary	  Fund,	  accessed:	  4.05.2010
20	  It	  is	  expected	  that	  inﬂa&on	  rates	  will	  fall	  within	  the	  aimed	  limits	  in	  2012	  to	  2013.	  
21	  Internet:	  www.memory.loc.gov	  -­‐	  American	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  accessed:	  15.06.2010
3.1. Romanian	  Gas	  Market
Most	  of	  the 	  natural 	  gas 	  consumed	  in 	  Romania 	  is	  imported	  from	  Russia 	  through	  the	  Progress	  
pipeline.	   At	   the	  moment,	   it	   has 	  been	  able	  to	   reduce	  the 	  imports	  by	   30%	  because	  of	  the	  
start-­‐up	   of	   a 	   second	   nuclear	   plant.	   Moreover,	   a	   third	   unit	   of	   the	   Cernavoda	   sta=on	   is	  
scheduled	  to	  begin	  in	  2006	  and	  reach	  comple=on	  by	  2011.
At	  the	  =me	  of	  the	  merger,	  namely	   2008,	  the	  gas	  reserves 	  were	  valued	  at	  162	  billion	  cubic	  
meters.	  The	  ﬁgures	  are 	  expected	  to	  drop	  un=l	  141	  billion	  cubic	  meters 	  by	  2010	   and	  to	  77	  
billion	  by	   2020,	  according	  to	  the	  Energy	   Strategy	   report	   for	  Romania 	  for	   the 	  period	  2007	   -­‐	  
2020.
3.2. Romanian	  Electricity	  Market
Regarding	  electricity	  genera=on,	  Romania	  has	  a	  capacity	  of	  22.2	  gigawaKs,	  according	  to	  the	  
same	  country	  report.	  With	  this 	  capacity,	   it	  is 	  southeastern	  Europe’s 	  largest	  power	  producer	  
and	   a	   net	   electricity	   exporter.	   However,	   current	   exploita=on	  of	   hydropower	   resources 	  is	  
thought	   to	  be 	  far	   below	  capacity.	  The	  U.S.	   Department	  of	  Energy	   es=mates	  that	   Romania	  
may	   have	  more	   than	  5,000	   loca=ons 	  favorable	   to	   hydroelectric	   power	   plants.	   (Internet:	  
www.memory.loc.gov	  -­‐	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  accessed:	  15.06.2010)
A	  certain	  decrease	  in	  imports	  is 	  no=ceable	  from	  2008	  to	  2009,	  according	  to	  the	  informa=on	  
issued	  by	   The	  Na=onal 	  Electricity	   and	  Heat	  Regulatory	   (ANRE).	  The	  decrease 	  is 	  due 	  to	  the	  
start-­‐up	  of	   the	  second	  nuclear	  plant.	   In	   the	  same	  =me,	   the	  quan=ty	   generated	  electricity	  
decreased	  from	  one	  year	  to	  another	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  previous	  periods.
No. Indicator UM 2008 2009
1 2 3 4
1 Generated	  Electricity TWh 64.01 56.69
2 Delivered	  Electricity TWh 59.07 52.40
3 Import TWh 0.92 0.68
4 Export TWh 5.37 3.15
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No. Indicator UM 2008 2009
5 Internal	  Consump&on TWh 54.63 49.92
6 Electricity	  supplied	  on	  the	  
regulated	  market
TWh 10.38 10.99
Table	  5:	  Romanian	  Electricity	  Market
Source:	  ANRE	  December	  2009	  (Internet:	  www.anre.ro,	  accessed:	  7.06.2010)
4. Legal	  CondiCons	  and	  ANRE
The	   following	   major	   pieces	   of	   legisla=on,	   are	   enforceable	   when	   regula=ng	   foreign	  
investment	  in	  Romania:
1) Commercial	  Code	  
2) Company	  Law	  
3) Compe==on	  Law	  
4) Law	  on	  Direct	  Investment	  
5) Law	  regarding	  the	  promo=on	  of	  direct	  investments	  
6) Law	  on	  Banking	  Ac=vi=es	  
7) Securi=es	  Law	  
8) Commercial	  Companies	  Priva=za=on	  Law	  
9) Trade	  Register	  Law
10) Taxa=on	  Law.
The	  agency	  responsible	  with	  the	  legal 	  issues 	  regarding	  electricity	  and	  gas 	  supply,	  genera=on,	  
transmission	  and	  distribu=on	  is 	  called	  ANRE	  (The	  Na=onal 	  Electricity	  and	  Heat	  Regulatory).	  It	  
is 	   a	   public	   independent	   body	   working	   together	   with	   other	   central 	   or	   local 	   public	  
administra=ve 	  bodies,	  and	  interna=onal 	  organiza=ons 	  to	  safeguard	  the 	  interests 	  of	  all 	  sector	  
players 	  to	  ensure	  eﬃciency,	  transparency,	  and	  consumer	  protec=on.	  The	  agency	  has	  also	  an	  
important	   saying	   in	   the 	  energy	   market	   liberaliza=on	   in	   Romania 	  as 	   it	   is 	  responsible 	   for	  
issuing	  licenses.	  The	  process 	  and	  requirements 	  are 	  outlined	  in	  the 	  "Regulatory	  White	  paper	  
for	   Sustaining	   the	   Liberaliza:on	   &	   Priva:za:on	   Processes	   in	   the	   Electricity	   and	   Heat	  
Sector".22
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22	  Internet:	  www.anre.ro	  -­‐	  ANRE,	  accessed:	  7.06.2010
The	  merger	  between	  E.ON	  and	  Electrica 	  Moldova	  falls 	  under	   the	  provisions 	  of	  Compe==on	  
Law	   no.	   21/1996,	   with	   subsequent	   amendments 	   and	   comple=ons,	   complying	   with	   the	  
provisions 	  of	  Art.11	  align	  (2)	  lit.	  b)	  regarding	  the	  economic	  concentra=ons 	  and	  provisions 	  of	  
Art.	  15	  regarding	  the	  turnover	  threshold.
5. The	  Energy	  Strategy	  Plan	  for	  Romania
The	  new	   energy	   policy	   has	   signiﬁcant	   inﬂuence 	  at	   the 	  European	   level 	  as 	  well.	   The	  new	  
energy	  strategy	  plan	  was 	  launched	  in	  2007	   and	  describes 	  energy	  as 	  an	  essen=al 	  ingredient	  
for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Union.	  The	  explana=on	  for	  this 	  central	  role	  lies 	  in	  the	  sector’s	  
impact	  on	  climate 	  change,	  in	  the	  Union’s 	  dependence 	  on	  energy	  imports,	  and	  in	  the	  upward	  
trend	   in	   energy	   prices	   which	   considerably	   aﬀects 	   the 	   households 	   and	   the	   industrial	  
consumers.	  As 	  an	  addi=onal 	  fact,	  the	  EU	  is 	  currently	   highly	   vulnerable	  to	  the	  instability	  of	  
interna=onal 	   energy	   markets	   and	   to	   the	   concentra=on	   of	   ownership	   over	   hydrocarbon	  
resources.	   The 	   target	   of	   the	   future	   is 	   to	   develop	   the	   internal 	  European	   Union’s 	  energy	  
market	   by	   encouraging	  energy	   savings 	  and	  bringing	  more	  investment	   to	  the	  sector.	  At	  the	  
same	  =me,	  it	  pays	  signiﬁcant	  aKen=on	  to	  the	  compe==ve	  and	  fair	  pricing	  regula=ons.	  
The	  thoughts 	  for	  the 	  future 	  regarding	  Romanian	  energy	  strategy	  include	  a	  2013	  horizon.	  The	  
na=onal 	  objec=ve 	  is 	  to	  meet	  the	  short	  and	  medium-­‐term	  energy	  demand	  and	  to	  create	  the	  
prerequisites 	   for	   na=onal	   energy	   security	   in	   the	   long	   run	   that	   would	   respond	   to	   the	  
requirements 	   imposed	   by	   a 	   modern	   market	   economy	   for	   safety	   and	   compe==veness.	  
Furthermore	  it	  has 	  to	  fulﬁll 	  the 	  obliga=ons 	  under	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  which	  points 	  out	  the	  
necessity	   of	   reducing	   the	   greenhouse	   gases 	   emissions	   by	   8%.	   Addi=onally,	   it	   needs	   to	  
promote	  and	  implement	  measures 	  in	  order	  to	  adjust	  for	  the	  eﬀects 	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  to	  
observe	  the	  principles	  of	  sustainable	  development.
With	  regard	  to	  Romania,	  a 	  member	  state 	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  it	  is 	  par=cularly	   important	  
to	  make	  sure	  it	  implements 	  the	  four	  major	  medium	  to	  long-­‐term	  objec=ves	  of	  the	  Union’s	  
Energy	  Strategy	  Plan:	  to	  enhance	  the 	  security	  of	  energy	  supply	  and	  of	  cri=cal	  infrastructure,	  
to	   increase	   compe==veness 	   in	   the	   sector,	   to	   reduce 	   the 	  environmental	   impact,	   and	   to	  
achieve	  the	  integra=on	  to	  the	  regional	  energy	  market.23	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23	  Internet:	  www.sdnp.ro	  -­‐	  The	  New	  Energy	  Strategy	  Plan	  (2007),	  accessed:	  8.06.2010
5.1. Energy	  security	  
As 	  a 	  ﬁrst	  step,	  Romania 	  has 	  to	  maintain	  na=onal	  sovereignty	  over	  primary	  energy	  resources	  
and	   independence	   in	   na=onal	   choices 	   in	   the	   energy	   sector.	   Then,	   it	   has 	   to	   ensure	   the	  
reliability	  of	  energy	  supply	  and	  to	  keep	  the	  degree	  of	  dependence	  on	  imports	  at	  a 	  low	  level.	  
It	  is 	  possible	  to	  achieve	  that	  through	  the	  diversiﬁca=on	  of	  external 	  sources,	  na=onal 	  energy	  
resources,	  na=onal 	  and	  regional 	  energy	   transport	  routes	  and	  networks.	   Addi=onally,	  it	   has	  
to	   promote 	   coopera=on,	   on	   a	   regional 	   level,	   for	   the 	   protec=on	   of	   cri=cal 	   energy	  
infrastructure.
5.2. Sustainable	  development
To	  achieve	  the	  objec=ve	  of	  sustainable 	  development	  Romania 	  will 	  need	  to	  improve	  energy	  
eﬃciency	   along	  the	  chain	  of	  resource-­‐produc=on-­‐transport-­‐distribu=on-­‐consump=on.	   This	  
would	  be	  feasible 	  through	  the 	  op=miza=on	  of	  produc=on	  and	  distribu=on	  processes 	  and	  the	  
reduc=on	  of	   total 	  consump=on	   of	   primary	   energy	   rela=ve 	  to	   the	   value	   of	   products 	  and	  
services.	   Addi=onal 	   to	   this,	   renewable 	   resources 	   have 	   to	   play	   an	   increasingly	   more	  
signiﬁcant	   role 	  in	  the	  energy	   produc=on	  in	  the	  future.	   In	  this 	  sense,	   a	  par=cular	   aKen=on	  
must	  be	  paid	  to	  support	  research	  development	  and	  innova=on.	  However,	  whilst	  aKemp=ng	  
to	   ﬁnd	   new	   alterna=ve	   sources 	   a 	   special 	   emphasis	   must	   be	   given	   to	   living	   up	   to	  
commitments	  to	  reduce	  the	  emissions	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  and	  atmospheric	  pollu=on.
5.3. CompeCCveness
Looking	   from	   an	   economic	   perspec=ve,	   maybe	   the	  most	   important	   objec=ve	   regarding	  
sustainable	  development	   of	   Romania	   in	   the	   	   long	   run	  would	  be	   to	   further	   develop	   and	  
improve	   compe==ve	   markets	   for	   electricity,	   gas,	   oil,	   uranium,	   coal 	   and	   energy	   sector	  
services.	   In	  this 	  view,	   the 	  main	   objec=ves 	  are:	   the	  increase	  of	   proﬁtability	   and	  access	  to	  
capital	   markets,	   the	   con=nuing	   of	   restructuring	   and	   priva=za=on	   process,	   the	   sector’s	  
liberaliza=on	   for	   transport	   and	   distribu=on,	   support	   for	   investments	   for	   new	   power	  
genera=on	  and	  beKer	  technology,	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  infrastructure,	  etc.
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Regarding	   liberaliza=on	   of	   the	   market,	   the 	   na=onal 	   policies 	   have	   to	   promote	   the	  
moderniza=on	  of	  the	  systems 	  through	  high	  performance 	  technologies 	  and	  thus 	  the 	  need	  for	  
support	  of	  uninterrupted	  and	  non-­‐discriminatory	  access 	  of	  interna=onal 	  market	  actors	  and	  
Foreign	  Direct	   Investment	  (FDI).	  The	  na=onal 	  policies 	  have 	  to	  be	  seconded	  by	  a 	  fric=onless	  
coopera=on	   with	   the	   relevant	   authori=es,	   namely	   the 	   government	   and	   the 	   Romanian	  
na=onal	  energy	  regulator	  ANRE.
The	  following	  two	  recommenda=ons 	  are	  made	  for	  Romania 	  in	  order	  to	  s=ck	  to	  the	  na=onal	  
strategy	  plan	  for	  sustainable	  development:
1. To	  establish	  an	  ins=tu=on,	  as	  a 	  part	  of	  the	  Romanian	  Government,	   specialized	  in	  
crea=ng	  and	   implemen=ng	   economic	   and	  social 	  development	   strategies 	  that	   is	  
coherent	  with	  the	  government’s	  plans	  and	  the	  EU	  ﬁnancing	  opportuni=es.
2. To	   create	  a 	  Ministry	   of	   Energy	   and	   Resources	   and	   to	   assure 	   the	   eﬃcient	   and	  
transparent	   func=oning	  of	   the 	  regulatory	  mechanism	  (ANRE)	   and	   its 	  specialized	  
agencies	  according	  to	  the 	  EU	  policies 	  and	  prac=ces,	  while 	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  
environmental	  issues.
VII. The	  RaConale	  behind	  the	  Merger	  /	  PrivaCzaCon	  
On	  April 	  4,	   2005,	   E.ON	   ENERGIE	   AG	   (as 	  the 	  acquirer)	  and	  SC	   Electrica 	  SA	   (as 	  the 	  target)	  
merged	  and	  concluded	  a 	  Priva=za=on	  Contract	  through	  which	  E.ON	  ENERGIE	  AG	  gained	  a	  
par=cipa=on	  of	  51%	  of	  the	  formerly	  state-­‐owned	  subsidiary	  SC	  Electrica 	  Moldova	  SA,	  under	  
the	  condi=on	  of	  fulﬁlling	  some	  intermit	  requirements.24
The	  Romanian	  government’s 	  decision	  to	  priva=ze	  comes 	  from	  the	  need	  to	  ensure	  Electrica	  
Moldova’s 	   necessary	   ﬁnancial 	   resources.	   By	   encouraging	   the	   par=cipa=on	   of	   strategic	  
investors 	  that	   possess	   the 	  managerial	   and	   opera=ons’	   speciﬁc	   know-­‐how,	   the	  Romanian	  
government	   assures 	   itself	   of	   the	   sector’s 	  development	   in	   the 	  context	   of	   energy	   market	  
liberaliza=on.	   Furthermore,	   according	   to	   the 	  European	  paKerns,	   the 	  market	   liberaliza=on	  
would	   encourage 	   compe==on	   which	   would	   consequently	   assure	   beKer	   services	   at	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24	  Laws:	  Decree	  No.	  57/17.02.2004
aﬀordable	   prices 	   to	   the	   consumers.	   Addi=onally,	   the 	   priva=za=on	   strategy	   pursued	   the	  
maximiza=on	   of	   the	   priva=za=on’s 	   transac=on	   value,	   though	   through	  a	   transparent	   and	  
compe==ve	   auc=on	   process 	   and	   an	   increase 	   in	   the	   professional 	   qualiﬁca=on	   of	   the	  
employees.	  
1. The	  privaCzaCon	  steps
Having	  a	  quick	  overlook	  over	  the	  event’s 	  sequences 	  facilitates	  a	  beKer	  understanding	  of	  the	  
ra=onale	  behind	  the 	  merger,	  from	  E.ON’s 	  perspec=ve;	  the	  ra=onale 	  behind	  the 	  priva=za=on,	  
from	  the	  Romanian	  Government’s	  perspec=ve.	  The	  following	  =meline	  describes 	  the	  basic	  
steps 	   in	   the	   priva=za=on	   process 	   of	   a 	   formerly	   state-­‐owned	   u=lity	   in	   the	   Romanian	  
transi=onal	  environment.
♦ In	  2003,	  the	  Romanian	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Finance,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  PHARE	  Oﬃce	  for	  
Payments 	  and	  Contrac=ng	   (“Oﬁciul 	  de	  Pla=	  si 	  Contractare	  PHARE”),	  selected	  the 	  main	  
priva=za=on	  consultant	  through	  a 	  public	  auc=on.	  The 	  consul=ng	  consor=um	  was	  lead	  by	  
the	  Banc	   of	   America 	  Securi=es 	  LLC	   (BAS)25.	   Responsible	   for	   the	   juridical 	  issues 	  were	  
Allen	   &	   Overy,	   an	   interna=onal 	   law	   consul=ng	   ﬁrm,	   and	   Nestor	   Nestor	   Diculescu	  
Kingston	  Petersen	  ,	  a 	  local 	  law	  consul=ng	  ﬁrm.	  The	  local 	  ﬁnancial 	  consultant,	  BDO	  Con=	  
and	  WS	  Atkins 	  plc.,	  an	  interna=onal 	  consultant	  on	  environmental	  issues,	  also	  took	  part	  
in	  the	  process.	  The	  ﬁx	  commission	  was	  covered	  through	  PHARE	  funds 	  by	  the 	  European	  
Commission.	  
♦ The	  consultants 	  ﬁled	  a 	  report	  which	   included	  several 	  analyses	  and	  recommenda=ons	  
which	   were	   made	   taking	   into	   account	   several 	   market	   research	   reports 	   and	   the	  
regula=on	  implied.	  Based	  on	  this 	  report,	  on	  April 	  7,	  2004,	  the	  priva=za=on	  strategy	   for	  
Electrica	  Moldova	  was	  voted	  by	  the	  Romanian	  Government.
♦ The	  Government’s 	  intent	   to	   sell 	  was 	  publicly	   stated	  via 	  an	   announcement	   published	  
April 	  28,	   2004,	   both	   in	  the	  internal 	  press 	  and	   in	   the	  Financial	  Times 	  newspaper,	   the	  
interna=onal 	   edi=on.	   The	   announcement	   addressed	   an	   invita=on	   to	   all 	   strategic	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25	  The	  consor&um	  also	  included	  Central	  Europe	  Trust	  Company	  Ltd,	  an	  independent	  strategic	  consultancy	  ﬁrm	  
specialized	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.
investors 	  for	   submi=ng	   their	   leKers	  of	   intent.	   It	   was 	  also	   speciﬁed	   that	   the	  investors	  
should	  meet	  some	  criteria	  related	  to:
o technical	  and	  opera=onal	  experience;
o capacity	  and	  resources;
o and	  experience	  with	  opera=ng	  a	  similar	  company,	  on	  liberalized	  markets.
♦ ANer	  the	  announcement,	  by	  May	  31,	  2004,	  ﬁve	  leKers	  of	  intent	  were	  received	  from:
1.	  AES	  –	  USA	  
2.	  CEZ	  a.s.	  –	  Czech	  Republic
3.	  E.ON	  Energie	  A.G.	  –	  Germany	  
4.	  PUBLIC	  POWER	  CORPORATION	  –	  Greece
5.	   The 	  Consor=um	   formed	  by	  UNION	  FENOSA	   INTERNATIONAL	   –	   Spain	  and	  
POWER	  DEVELOPMENT	  LIMITED	  –	  Malta.
♦ ANer	  analyzing	  in	  detail 	  all 	  the 	  documents 	  submiKed,	  the	  team	  of	  consultants 	  decided	  
in	  June,	  17,	  2004,	   that	   all 	  ﬁve 	  candidates 	  would	  be	  able 	  to	  proceed	  forward	  with	  the	  
priva=za=on	  process.	  The	  process	  included:	  access 	  to	  the	  company’s 	  database,	  mee=ngs	  
with	  the	  SOE’s 	  management	  and	  the 	  team	  of	  specialists,	  visits 	  at	   the	  company’s	  sites,	  
and	  mee=ngs	  and	  discussions	  with	  ANRE26.	  
♦ The	  priva=za=on	  procedures 	  knew	  a 	  transparent	  process	  of	  selec=on	  and	  on	  August	  27,	  
2004,	   three 	  out	   of	  the	  ﬁve	  ini=al 	  candidates 	  made	  it	   to	  the	  short	   list:	   E.ON,	  CEZ,	  and	  
Union	  Fenosa.	   Further	   on,	   preliminary	   nego=a=ons 	  took	   place,	   and	  their	   main	  target	  
had	  been	  to	  clarify	  of	  the	  following:	  
a)	  the	  business	  strategy,	  the	  organiza=on,	  and	  management	  of	  the	  SOE;
b) the	  legal	  requirements	  to	  be	  followed	  when	  sezng	  further	  necessary	  
adjustments;
c) the	  content	  of	  the	  priva=za=on	  contract,	  and	  of	  the	  addi=onal	  documents	  
needed	  for	  the	  transac=on.
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26	  ANRE	  stands	  for	  “Autoritatea	  de	  Reglementare	  în	  Domeniul	  Energiei	  Electrice”.
♦ October	   18,	   2004,	   was 	  the	  day	   the	  Romanian	  Government	   received	  the	  ﬁnal	  oﬀers,	  
including	  the	  addi=onal	  requirements,	  from	  two	  out	  of	  the	  three	  investors 	  shortlisted:	  
E.ON	  and	  CEZ.	  Only	  these	  two	  could	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  requirements	  imposed.
♦ On	  November	   8,	   2004,	   the	  two	   investors:	   E.ON	   and	  CEZ,	   submiKed	   their	   ﬁnal 	  oﬀers	  
again,	  this	  =me	  with	  several 	  adjustments	  made	  to	  meet	  the	  Government’s 	  condi=on	  of	  
maximizing	  the	  priva=za=on’s	  transac=on	  value.	  
♦ According	  to	  the	  last	  oﬀers	  submiKed,	   E.ON	  was 	  declared	  the	  winner	   of	  the	  auc=on	  
(April	  5,	  2005).
2. The	  privaCzaCon	  strategy
Electrica 	  Moldova’s 	  priva=za=on	  was	  made	  through	  Romanian	  state’s	  ownership	  transfer	  to	  
a 	  strategic	   investor	   that	  had	  signiﬁcant	  experience 	  in 	  the	  u=lity	   sector,	  which	  also	  was 	  be	  
able 	  to	  ensure	  the	  company’s	  con=nuity	  on	  the	  long	  run.	   The 	  elected	  candidate	  had	  been	  
E.ON.
The	   Romanian	   Government	   knew	   the 	   SOE’s 	   real	   need	   for	   liquidity	   and	   therefore	   the	  
following	  payment	  method	  was	  adopted:	  
(i) 24.62%	   of	   Electrica 	   Moldova’s 	   social	   capital	   was 	   sold	   to	   E.ON.	  
Consequently,	  E.ON	  acquired	  a	  number	  of	  10,174,004	  nomina=ve	  ordinary	  
shares,	  each	  one	  having	  a	  nominal	  value 	  of	  ROL	  100,00027 	  (April	  4,	  2005).	  
E.ON	  paid	  EUR	   31,4	  Million	   for	   the	  24.62%	   share	  of	   Electrica 	  Moldova’s	  
social	  capital;
(ii) at	  the	  same	  =me	  a	  cash	  infusion	  was	  made.	  The 	  amount	  of	  cash	  absorbed	  
by	   the	  company	   needed	  to	  be	  suﬃciently	   large 	  so	  that	   E.ON	   could	  own	  
51%	  of	  shares,	  which	  is	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  vo=ng	  /	  cash	  ﬂow	  rights;
(iii)	  in	  the	  end,	  the	  total	  transac=on	  price	  amounted	  EUR	  100	  Million.
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27	  The	  Appendix	  enhances	  the	  exchange	  rate	  for	  the	  end	  of	  April	  2005,	  given	  by	  the	  Romanian	  Na&onal	  Bank.	  
Addi&onally,	  ader	  the	  Romanian	  Leu	  conversion	  at	  July	  1,	  2005,	  ROL	  100,000	  is	  equal	  to	  RON	  10.	  The	  historical	  
data	  of	  the	  Romanian	  Na&onal	  Bank	  is	  published	  in	  RON.
The	  priva=za=on	  strategy	  also	  pre-­‐allowed	  E.ON	  to	  cede	  up	  to	  5%	  out	  of	  the	  51%	  majority	  
shares 	   to	   one	   or	   both	   of	   the	   following	   ﬁnancial 	   investors:	   the	   European	   Bank	   for	  
Development	   and	  Reconstruc=on	   (EBRD)	   and	   the	   Interna=onal	  Finance	  Corpora=on	  (IFC).	  
This 	  eventually	   happened,	   on	  September	   28,	   2006,	  when	  EBRD	  acquired	  the	  5%	  package	  
and	  engaged	  to	  support	   and	  facilitate	  the	  eﬀorts 	  made	  by	   the	  E.ON	  Group	   to	  realize	  the	  
necessary	  technical	  and	  opera=onal	  improvements	  in	  the	  opera=ng	  company.28
3.  The Strategic Fit
First,	   the	  strategic	   ﬁt	  between	  the	  acquirer	  and	  the	  target	   comes	  from	  the	  ﬁt	   in	  business	  
strategy.	  This 	  was 	  conﬁrmed	  to	  be	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  for	  E.ON’s 	  management,	  based	  
in	  Targu	  Mures,	  Romania,	  when	  deciding	  to	  take 	  over	  Electrica 	  Moldova.	  When	  asked	  during	  
the	  interview,	  the	  CFO	  replied	  with:
“Above	  everything,	  the	  merger	  project	  was	  important	  because	  it	  contributes	  to	  the	  
realiza:on	  of	  the	  company’s	  strategic	  goals.”
Apparently,	  ﬁnancing	  was	  not	  a	  problem	  as	  long	  as	  the	  project	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  strategic.	  
“One	  can	  always	  ﬁnd	  money	  to	  ﬁnance	  a	  good	  project.”	  (E.ON’s	  CFO)
Surprisingly,	   proﬁtability	   of	   the	   investment	   was 	  not	   a 	   strong	   enough	   driver	   to	   entail 	   a	  
posi=ve	  decision,	   but	   the	  ﬁnancial 	  evalua=on	   techniques 	  had	  an	   important	   saying	   in	  the	  
ﬁnal	  decision.	  Then,	  the 	  CFO	  and	  a	  technical 	  manager	  were	  asked	  to	  rank,	  using	  a 	  scale 	  from	  
1	   to	  5,	   the	  following	  possible 	  drivers 	  for	   strategic	   investment	  decision	  making:	   risks,	  costs,	  
value,	   market	   entry,	   resource	   seeking,	   compe==on,	   staﬀ	   mo=va=on	   and	  professionalism,	  
social 	  responsibility,	  and	  image.	  The 	  results 	  gave	  diﬀerent	  results	  to	  what	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  
the	  highest	   strategic	   ﬁt	   of	   the	  investment.	   The	  CFO	   saw	  market	   entry,	   resource	   seeking,	  
compe==on,	   social 	   responsibility,	   and	   E.ON’s 	   image	   to	   be	   the	   most	   important	   factors.	  
Whereas 	   in	   contrast,	   the	   technical 	  manager	   saw	   resource 	   seeking	   with	   the	   purpose	   if	  
diversifying	  the	  company’s	  ac=vity	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  as	  the	  most	  important.
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28	  Internet:	  www.ebrd.com,	  European	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruc&on	  and	  Development,	  accessed:	  3.07.2010
Taking	  into	  account	  the	  type	  of	  services 	  provided	  by	  the	  target	  SOE,	  Electrica	  Moldova,	  and	  
the	   categories 	  of	   consumers 	   to	  whom	   it	   addresses,	   it	   is 	  highly	   important	   to	   deﬁne 	  the	  
following	  relevant	  markets:
-­‐	  the	  market	  of	  electric	  energy	  distribu=on	  for	  cap=ve	  consumers;
-­‐	  the	  market	  of	  electric	  energy	  distribu=on	  for	  eligible	  consumers;
-­‐	  the	  market	  of	  electric	  energy	  supply	  for	  cap=ve	  consumers;
-­‐	  the	  market	  of	  electric	  energy	  supply	  for	  eligible	  consumers.
Moreover,	  when	  considering	  the 	  Compe==on	  Law	  No.	  21/1996	  and	  the 	  licenses 	  conferred	  
by	  the	  energy	  regulator	  ANRE,	  the	  geographic	  market	  is	  represented	  by:
-­‐ Moldova	  area,	  for	  electric	  energy	  distribu=on	  for	  both	  cap=ve	  and	  eligible	  consumers;
-­‐ Moldova	  area,	  for	  electric	  energy	  supply	  for	  cap=ve	  consumers;
-­‐ Romanian	  territory,	  for	  electric	  energy	  supply	  for	  eligible	  consumers.	  
(Governmental	  Decision	  No.	  99/27.05.2005)
The	  market	  of	  electric	   energy	   distribu=on	  was	  at	  the	  =me	  of	   the	  merger	   a 	  closed	  market.	  
The	   distribu=on	   licenses	   allowed	   the	   distribu=on	   companies 	  holding	   them	   to	   aKain	   an	  
exclusive 	  character.	  Considering	  this 	  scenario,	  the 	  market	  was	  free	  of	  compe==on,	  which	  is	  
by	   itself	   a 	  huge	   incen=ve	  to	  encourage 	  the 	  acquisi=on	  of	   an	  enterprise	  such	  as	  Electrica	  
Moldova	  that	  owns	  such	  a	  license.
The	   market	   of	   electric	   energy	   supply	   was 	   at	   =me	   of	   the	   merger	   par=ally	   open.	   Its	  
dimensions 	  are	   inﬂuenced	   by	   the	   consumers	  that	   become	  eligible 	  but	   yet	   chose 	  to	   stay	  
cap=ve.	   The	  diﬀerence	  between	  the	  two	  is 	  that	   electric	   energy	   is 	  supplied	  to	  the 	  cap=ve	  
consumers	   at	   regulated	   tariﬀs.	   The	   market	   becomes	   more	   open	   as 	   the	   minimum	  
consump=on	  limit,	  which	  a 	  consumer	  has 	  to	  reach	  to	  become	  eligible,	  decreases.	  Thus,	  “the	  
market	  opening	  is 	  being	  realized	  through	  a	  progressive 	  increment	  of	  the	  compe==ve 	  market	  
share,	   according	   to	   the 	  provisions 	  of	   the 	  energe=c	   strategy	   and	  policy,	   and	   is 	  approved	  
through	  a	  Government	  decision”.	  (Governmental	  Decision	  No.	  99/27.05.2005)
Analyzing	   from	   the 	  Romanian	   Government’s 	  perspec=ve	   and	   considering	   the	   presented	  
arguments,	  the 	  economic	  concentra=on	  realized	  through	  taking	  over	  the	  control 	  of	  Electrica	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Moldova	   by	   E.ON	   does 	   not	   imply	   a 	   signiﬁcant	   restrain,	   suppression	   or	   distor=on	   of	  
compe==on	  in	  Romania	  on	  the	  relevant	  markets,	  as	  these	  were	  deﬁned	  before.
The	  market	  condi=ons 	  in	  Romania	  are	  of	  a	  such	  nature	  that,	  in	  a 	  short	  =me,	  there	  won’t	  be	  
any	  signiﬁcant	  price	  increases 	  on	  the	  above 	  deﬁned	  relevant	  market,	  neither	  for	  cap=ve	  nor	  
eligible	  consumers.	  Consequently,	   from	  the 	  acquirer’s	  perspec=ve	  (E.ON),	  the	  fundamental	  
purpose	  of	  this	  merger	  is 	  the	  diversiﬁca=on	  of	  the	  company’s 	  ac=vity	  through	  entering	  the	  
electricity	   market	   and	   the 	   improvement	   of	   the	   economical 	  performance	   by	   acquiring	   a	  
company	  (Electrica	  Moldova)	  that	  ﬁts	  E.ON’s	  business	  strategy.
4. TransformaCon	  of	  the	  SOE
According	  to	  the	  Priva=za=on	  Contract	  and	  the	  Governmental	  Decision	  No.	   99/27.05.2005	  
regarding	   the 	  economic	   concentra=on	   realized	   by	   E.ON	   ENERGIE	   AG	   by	   taking	   over	   the	  
control 	  of	  the	  state	  owned	  enterprise	  Electrica 	  Moldova 	  SA,	  the	  main	  eﬀects 	  that	  are 	  aimed	  
via	  this	  economic	  transac=on	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  following:
✓ the	  unbundling	  of	  transmission	  and	  distribu=on	  (Electrica 	  Moldova 	  has 	  split	  aNer	  
the	  merger	  in	  two:	  E.ON	  Moldova	  Furnizare	  SA	  and	  E.ON	  Moldova	  Distribu=e	  SA),	  
according	  to	  the	  electricity	  direc=ve	  2003/54/EC;
✓ the	  increment	  of	  distribu=on	  networks	  general	  eﬃciency;	  
✓ the	  moderniza=on	  of	  distribu=on	  assets;	  
✓ the	  op=miza=on	  of	  personnel	  structure;	  
✓ lining	  up	  Electrica	  Moldova	  SA	  to	  the	  occidental	  standards	  in	  the	  ﬁeld;	  
✓ and	  the	  increment	  of	  quality	  and	  reliability	  of	  services.
5. Government	  and	  ANRE	  Involvement
It	   is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	   in	  Romania,	   foreign	  and	  domes=c	   investments	  enjoy	  equal	  
treatment.	  Moreover,	  ﬁscal	  facili=es 	  have	  been	  promised	  by	   the	  Romanian	  Government	  for	  
strategic	  projects	  with	  the 	  purpose	  of	  promo=ng	  green	  energy.	  According	  to	  Law	  220/2008,	  
Electrica	  Moldova,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  strategic	  investors	  can	  always	  beneﬁt	  from	  the	  following:
❖ loans	  awarded	  by	  the 	  Romanian	  Government	  guaranteeing	  up	  to	  50%	  of	  the 	  loan	  
on	  medium	  and	  long	  term;
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❖ the	   ensuring	   of	   transport	   infrastructure 	   for	   commencing	   and	   developing	   the	  
strategic	  investment;
❖ the	  ensuring	  of	  ways	  of	  access	  in	  the	  exis=ng	  infrastructure;
❖ tax	  exemp=ons	  of	  reduc=ons	  for	  the	  reinvested	  proﬁt;
❖ ﬁnancial	  compensa=on	  for	  crea=ng	  new	  jobs	  and	  raising	  employment.
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  case	  the	  acquirer	  E.ON	  does	  not	  align	  with	  the	  clauses 	  speciﬁed	  in	  the	  
Priva=za=on	  Contract,	   the	  Romanian	  Government	   is 	  en=tled	  to	  apply	   penal=es.	   These	  are	  
can	  amount	   up	   to	   the	  maximum	   of	   the	   adjusted	   acquiring	   price,	   which	  means	  up	   to	   a	  
maximum	  of	  EUR	  32,	  2	  Million.29	  
The	  Romanian	   Energy	   Regulatory	   Authority	   ANRE	   is 	  another	   important	   factor	   that	   E.ON	  
needs 	  to	  permanently	  take	  into	  account	  especially	  when	  establishing	  the	  energy	  prices.	  The	  
regula=on	  tariﬀs 	  are 	  applied	  for	  cap=ve	  consumers,	  including	  consumers	  that	  have	  decided	  
not	  to	  use	  their	  eligible	  statute.	  E.ON	  is 	  bound	  to	  apply	   these	  regulated	  tariﬀs 	  un=l	  a 	  total	  
liberaliza=on	   of	   electric	   energy	   market.	   ANerwards 	   the	   prices	   will	   be 	   established	   in	   a	  
compe==ve	  manner,	  based	  on	  the	  demand	  and	  supply	  rela=on.
The	  es=mates 	  at	  the 	  =me	  of	  the 	  merger	  were 	  that	  the	  electric	  energy	   supply	  market	  will 	  be	  
completely	   liberalized	  by	   the	  year	   200730.	   From	  that	   =me	  on,	   ANRE	  will 	  not	   grant	   supply	  
licenses 	  with	  exclusive	  character	  anymore,	  thus 	  completely	  opening	  the	  market	  for	  poten=al	  
compe=tors.	  Of	  course,	  every	  poten=al	  compe=tor	  has	  to	  comply	  with	  both	  the 	  norms 	  and	  
regula=ons 	  of	   the	  Romanian	   legisla=on	  and	   those 	  issued	  by	   ANRE	   to	  acquire	   the	   supply	  
license	  and	  the	  necessary	  func=oning	  authoriza=ons.
6. Foreign	  Investment	  Risk
Even	  though,	  the	  macroeconomic	  picture	  is 	  recently	   improving	  from	  quarter	  to	  quarter,	  the	  
environment	   speciﬁcity	   of	   the 	  emerging	  markets	  s=ll 	  has	  a 	  strong	   impact	   on	   the	  foreign	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30 	  The	  es&mates	  were	   accurate	  because	  from	  July	  1,	  2005	   all	   industrial	  consumers	  were	  able	  to	   choose	  their	  
energy	  supplier	  and	  the	  energy	  market	  was	  completely	  liberalized.	  Addi&onally,	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  compe&&on	  
grew	  from	  10%	  in	  2000	  to	  83.5%	  in	  2005.	  
direct	  investment	  ac=vity	   in	  the	  area.	  The 	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  is 	  par=cularly	   known	  
for	  having	  high	  country	  risks,	  which	  is	  an	  obstacle	  to	  investment.
According	   to	   Business 	  Monitor	   Interna=onal	   (BMI)31,	   a 	  leading,	   independent	   provider	   of	  
ra=ngs,	  rankings 	  for	  diﬀerent	   regions	  and	  industry	  sectors,	   Romania	  is 	  rated	  C,	   in	  terms	  of	  
riskiness.	  The	  sovereign	  ra=ngs 	  range	  from	  A	   to	  E,	  where	  A	   signiﬁes 	  very	   liKle	  to	  no	  risk.	  
Addi=onally,	  Romania’s 	  market	  outlook	  scores 	  3	  on	  a 	  scale 	  of	  1	  to	  5,	  where	  1	  would	  be	  very	  
bullish	  and	  5	   very	   bearish.	   A	   score 	  of	   3	   is 	  being	   neutral.	   Regarding	   the	  ability	   to	  pay,	   a	  
midterm	   perspec=ve	   for	   the 	  years 	  2007-­‐2010	   is 	  given	   in	   the	   table 	  bellow	   and	   shows	   a	  
regress	  in	  2009,	  which	  however	  is 	  not	  drama=cal	  (from	  39	  to	  31).	  Each	  number	  is	  a 	  mark	  out	  
of	  45.
Table	  6:	  Sovereign	  Risk	  Ra:ngs	  for	  CEE	  (2007	  -­‐	  2010)
Source:	  BMI
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31	  BMI’s	  purpose:	  “Our	  mission	  is	  to	  integrate	  Country	  Risk	  and	  Financial	  Markets	  analysis	  with	  Industry	  
Research,	  to	  best	  inform	  decision-­‐making	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  in	  mul&na&onal	  companies,	  ﬁnancial	  ins&tu&ons,	  
mul&laterals	  and	  government.”	  (Internet:	  www.businessmonitor.com	  -­‐	  Interna&onal	  Business	  Monitor,	  
accessed:	  21.06.2010)
7. Case	  Study	  Conclusion
All 	   in 	   all,	   now,	   aNer	   the	   ﬁve	   years	   from	   the 	  priva=za=on	   decision,	   the	   beneﬁts	   for	   the	  
Romanian	  state	  come	  primarily	   in 	  the	  form	  of	  having	  a 	  formerly	  state-­‐owned	  company,	  with	  
many	  managerial 	  and	  supply	   chain	  ineﬃciencies,	   transformed	  into	  a 	  modernized	  company.	  
Addi=onally,	   the 	   priva=za=on	   in	   case 	   solidiﬁes	   the	   premises	   for	   crea=ng	   a 	   compe==ve	  
energy	  market	  in	  Romania.	  The	  posi=ve	  eﬀects	  of	  a 	  compe==ve 	  market	  are	  to	  be 	  felt	  by	  the	  
end	  consumer	   that	  will 	  enjoy	  having	  lower	  bills.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	  Romanian	  Oﬃcials	  
declared	  that	  the 	  ownership	  concentra=on	  had	  barely	   no	  posi=ve 	  eﬀect	  on	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Economy	  and	  Commerce’s	  budget.	  32
The	  best	  outcome	  of	   the	  merger	   for	   E.ON	  stands	  in	  the	  access 	  to	  a 	  new	  market	  (Moldova	  
area),	  that	  at	  the 	  =me	  of	  the 	  merger	  and	  for	  two	  more	  years 	  following	  it,	  was 	  a 	  compe==on-­‐
free 	  market.	  Consequently,	  through	  merging,	   it	  achieved	  synergis=c	   gains 	  from	  diversifying	  
in	  a 	  new	  industry	  (electricity)	  and	  being	  able 	  to	  u=lize 	  its 	  surplus 	  capacity	   of	  management	  
and	   technological	   know-­‐how.	   However,	   even	   if	   promises	   were 	  made	   by	   the	   Romanian	  
Government	   that	  ﬁnancial 	  support	  will 	  be 	  given	  for	   innova=ve	  projects 	  that	  help	  building	  /	  
modernizing	  the	  infrastructure,	  not	  much	  has	  been	  done	  in	  this	  respect.	  (Source:	  Interview)
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Conclusions
The	  present	   paper	   covers 	  the	  theore=cal 	  aspects	   regarding	  mergers	  and	  priva=za=on	  by	  
looking	   at	   the 	   posi=ve	   eﬀects 	   obtained	   through	   the	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   from	   one	  
company	  to	  another.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  research	  is 	  the	  South	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  
region,	  and	  par=cularly	  the	  energy	   industry	  because	  of	  its	  strategic	  importance	  for	   the	  area	  
of	  interest.	  The	  empirical	  analysis 	  should	  provide	  support	  that	  both	  the 	  management	  of	  the	  
acquirer	   and	   the	  government	   engaged	   in	   a	  priva=za=on	  primarily	   look	   for	   a 	  strategic	   ﬁt	  
between	  the	  companies	  and	  follow	  the	  goal 	  of	  transforming	  an	  unproduc=ve	  and	  ineﬃcient	  
SOE	  into	  an	  eﬃcient	  and	  beKer	  managed	  one,	  at	  the	  same	  =me.	  
First,	   the	   reasons	   behind	   merging	   were	   iden=ﬁed.	   At	   this 	   point	   the	   entrepreneurial	  
dimension	  was	  taken	  into	  account.	  Mergers 	  and	  acquisi=ons 	  have	  proven	  to	  be 	  strategies 	  to	  
create 	  value.	   There	   is 	  the 	  possibility	   to	   look	   at	   a	  merger	   from	  a	  ﬁnancial	  or	   a 	  strategic	  
perspec=ve	  when	  valuing	  its 	  outcome.	  The 	  two	  perspec=ves	  complete	  each	  other	  perfectly.	  
Value	  crea=on	  comes	  from	  synergis=c	  gains 	  and	  it	  also	  is 	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  similarity	   or	  
complementarity	   of	  the 	  acquirer	  with	  the 	  target	   ﬁrm,	  what	  we	  would	  call 	  the	  strategic	  ﬁt.	  
Another	   relevant	  ﬁnding	  is 	  the	  fact	   that	   the	  manager’s 	  decision	  when	  considering	  a 	  cross-­‐
border	   merger	   with	   a	   state-­‐owned	   company	   is 	   highly	   inﬂuenced	   by	   the	   future	  
government’s 	   /	   regula=ng	   authori=es’	   involvement	   and	   the 	   investment	   risk	   of	   the	   host-­‐
country.
The	   second	   research	   dimension	   relates	   to	   the	   government’s 	   point	   of	   view	   on	   the	  
transac=on.	   The	   ﬁrst	   order	   reasons	   to	   priva=ze	   are 	   budgetary	   constraint	   or	   external	  
pressure.	   Then,	   there 	   are	   some	   addi=onal 	   reasons,	   like 	   opera=onal 	   and	   managerial	  
ineﬃciencies 	  of	   state-­‐owned	   companies,	   that	   urge	   state	   oﬃcials 	  to	   accept	   loosing	   their	  
controlling	  power,	   even	  beyond	  their	   poli=cal 	  driven	  reluctance.	  Governments 	  all 	  over	  the	  
world	  start	  realizing	  that	  eﬃciency	  and	  performance	  are,	  in	  fact,	  the 	  factors	  that	  ensure	  re-­‐
elec=ons.	  When	  focusing	  on	  the 	  energy	   industry,	   the	  explana=on	  lies 	  in	  the 	  fact	   that	  high	  
energy	   consump=on	   bills 	  have	   created	   general 	  awareness 	  and	   con=nues 	  to	   awaken	   the	  
interest	   of	   the	  end	  consumer.	   Priva=za=ons	  of	  u=li=es	  have 	  proved	  to	  be	  success	  stories	  
because	  of	  their	  poten=al	  to	  eliminate	  many	  ineﬃciencies 	  that	  result	  from	  state	  being	  a 	  bad	  
owner	  of	  companies.	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Addi=onally,	   a	  relevant	  conclusion	  can	  be	  drawn	  by	   looking	  at	   the	  priva=za=on	  paKerns	  in	  
the	  SCEE	  area.	  The 	  recent	   intense 	  priva=za=on	  ac=vity	   in	  South	  Central 	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  
stands 	  as 	  a 	  clear	   signal 	  that	   transi=onal 	  economies 	  of	   the	  region	  are 	  ready	   to	   turn	  from	  
communism	   to	   democra=c	   capitalism.	   The 	   facts 	   and	   ﬁgures 	   show	   posi=ve	   eﬀects 	   of	  
priva=zing	   on	   revenues,	   cost	   reduc=on	   and	   proﬁtability	   of	   the	   formerly	   state-­‐owned	  
enterprises.	  Moreover,	   intense 	  priva=za=on	  ac=vity	   is 	  registered	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  of	  the	  
area.	  This 	  has 	  a	  lot	   to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  transi=onal 	  economies	  of	  SCEE	  region	  were	  
highly	  encouraged	  to	  liberalize 	  their	  energy	  markets 	  and	  to	  facilitate 	  priva=za=on	  programs	  
by	  the	  European	  Union.	  
To	  summarize,	  it	  seems 	  that	  foreign	  investors 	  have 	  begun	  to	  spot	  the	  opportuni=es 	  of	  doing	  
business 	   in	   the	   South	  Central	   Eastern	   European	   countries	  and	  with	   the 	  governments	  of	  
these	  countries.	   Hence,	   priva=za=on	   turned	   out	   to	  be	  a 	  good	  way	   of	   tapping	   synergis=c	  
gains	  and	  gains 	  coming	   from	  successfully	   diversifying	  on	  a	  new	  market	   by	   acquiring	  state-­‐
owned	  companies.	  However,	  necessary	  prerequisites 	  like	  being	  in	  the	  same	  business,	  having	  
the	  same	  business 	  strategy,	  or	   disposing	  over	   similar	   or	  complementary	   resources,	  have	  to	  
be	  met.	  	  
	  
RecommendaCon	  for	  future	  research
It	  is 	  a	  fact	  that	  the	  Communist	  and	  formerly	  Communist	  countries 	  are 	  undergoing	  drama=c	  
changes 	   in	   their	   poli=cal	   and	   economic	   processes	   making	   the	   reliability	   of	   the	  
macroeconomic	   data	   from	   the	   region	   doubjul.	   Moreover,	   it	   is 	   hard	   to	   quan=fy	   such	  
processes 	  in	  empirical 	  tests.	  This 	  brings 	  us	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  data	  availability,	  especially	   in	  
English.	   	  There	  is	  barely	   no	  industry-­‐level 	  data 	  and	  most	  of	  the	  studies 	  on	  the	  topic	  rely	   on	  
data 	  coming	  from	  a 	  single 	  source.	  For	  example,	  there	  is 	  barely	  no	  informa=on	  about	  voucher	  
priva=za=ons	  in	   the	   former	   Communist	   countries.	   Further	   research	  should	  overcome	  this	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Ownership	  of	  electricity	  and	  gas	  industry	  in	  the	  EU,	  1997
(M=	  municipal;	  P=private;	  S=state)
Table	  7:	  Ownership	  of	  electricity	  and	  gas	  industry	  in	  the	  EU
Source:	  Interna&onal	  Labour	  Oﬃce	  Report,	  1999
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AcCviCes	  of	  internaConal	  companies	  in	  energy	  industry	  in	  Europe
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Table	  8:	  Ac&vi&es	  of	  interna&onal	  companies	  in	  the	  energy	  industry	  (Europe)
Source:	  De	  Luca,	  L.,	  ILO,	  1998,	  p.151
Exchange	  Rate	  RON	  -­‐	  EUR	  for	  April	  2005
Symbol Currency 29 Apr. 2005
EUR Euro 3.6211
Table	  9:	  Exchange	  rate	  RON	  -­‐	  EUR	  (Apr.	  2005)
Source:	  The	  Romanian	  Na&onal	  Bank	  Archive
59
PrivaCzaCon	  Revenues	  by	  region,	  1988	  -­‐	  1998
Figure	  5:	  Priva&za&on	  revenues	  by	  region
Source:	  Gibbon,	  H.,	  (1998),	  “Worldwide	  Economic	  Orthodoxy”
PrivaCzaCon	  revenues	  by	  industry	  sector,	  1988	  -­‐	  1989
Figure	  6:	  Priva&za&on	  revenues	  by	  sector
Source:	  Gibbon,	  H.,	  (1998),	  "Worldwide	  Economic	  Orthodoxy"
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